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THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN. By Francis Fukuyama.
New York: The Free Press. 1992. Pp. xxiii, 418. $24.95.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY. By Jean L. Cohen and An-
drew Arato. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1992. Pp. xxi, 771. $45.
I. THE CURTAIN PARTS
Forty years a firmament dividing East and West, Left and Right,
State and Market, the iron curtain one day crumbled like so much
meringue. With it crumbled many realities and realisms that once
seemed hard as gunmetal: the determination of international relations
by the interests and relative strength of military elites, the total control
of totalitarian states over their societies, the pseudosophisticated view
that, in Francis Fukuyama's phrase, "nation-states [are] like billiard
balls, whose internal contents, hidden by opaque shells, are irrelevant
in predicting their behavior" (p. 248). The shells cracked, the curtain
parted, and the intractable reality that force rules politics was, at least
for the moment, exposed as mere appearance.
In a chapter of his Phenomenology entitled "Force and Under-
standing: Appearance and the Supersensible World,"' Hegel evokes
the vertigo we experience at such moments, when the forces that rule
our world are revealed to be contingent interpretive constructs. We
need simplifying generalizations to order our world, and living in an
ordered world means treating its regularities as real, its particularity as
ephemeral, even illusory. But when regularity itself proves ephemeral,
we are reminded that our world was always capable of infinitely varied
interpretation. At such moments theories abound, interpretive con-
structs sell for a quarter on every corner, while contingency and
change seem like the only constants. Our world inverts and the rain-
bow seems realer than the laws of optics.2
The experience of this inversion, in which the world suddenly
seems much realer than our ideas of it, paradoxically propels us to-
ward idealism. At the moment when the proud mind - its expecta-
tions dramatically defeated - might be expected to yield in humility
* Professor of Law, SUNY, Buffalo. A.B. 1977, Princeton; J.D. 1980, Yale. - Ed.
1. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 179-213 (J.B. Baillie trans., rev. 2d ed.,
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949) (1807).
2. See id. at 197-210.
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to events, it is distracted by its own reflection. "How wrong I was," it
marvels, "but how powerful. For the past forty years, it is I who have
ruled the world - not national interest, not nuclear balance, not mili-
tary force, not totalitarian bureaucracy - but I who imagined each of
these forces."
Just when events clamor for our attention, we become most con-
scious of the operation of our minds in structuring and interpreting
the world of events. The really momentous changes, the real disconti-
nuities, it then seems, are in the realm of thought rather than events.
And so our gaze focuses through events, at ourselves.3
Th[e] curtain... hanging before the inner world is withdrawn, and we
have here the inner being gazing into the inner realm .... [W]hat we
have here is Self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called
curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen
unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may
thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be
seen.
4
So today as we gaze in wonder, eastward or westward as geogra-
phy dictates, at the spectacle exposed by the withdrawal of the iron
curtain, we are searching for ourselves. We now see that the curtain
was not only the boundary of our world, but the contour of our own
minds, a boundary of our own creation, defining the conceivable and
delimiting the visible. In a world undivided between communism and
capitalism, how will we define ourselves? Where will our new bounda-
ries be?
As if to confirm Hegel's derivation of idealist metaphysics from the
experience of contingency, many observers have turned to Hegel for
aid in accounting for communism's unforeseen collapse and in imagin-
ing the world to follow. This review essay examines two such Hege-
lian responses to the events of 1989, The End of History and the Last
Man by Francis Fukuyama 5 and Civil Society and Political Theory by
Jean Cohen 6 and Andrew Arato.7
Fukuyama reads the collapse of communism as the millenarian tri-
umph of liberalism and the end of meaningful struggle over values in
international politics. Following Marx' famous claim to have inverted
3. See id at 202.
Thus, then, with the process of explaining, we see the ebb and flow of change, which was
formerly characteristic of the sphere of appearance, and lay outside the inner world, finding
its way into the region of the supersensible itself. Our consciousness, however, has passed
from the inner being as an object over to understanding on the other side, and finds the
changing process there.
Id.
4. Id. at 212-13.
5. Resident consultant at the Rand Corporation.
6. Associate Professor of Political Theory at Columbia University.
7. Andrew Arato is Professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research.
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the Hegelian dialectic,8 Fukuyama sets out to show that to discredit
Marx' philosophy of history is to vindicate Hegel's. Fukuyama's por-
trayal of Hegel as the prophet of liberalism is notable for the interest it
has excited rather than for the agreement it commands or deserves.
Part II of this essay explains this notoriety by reference to the con-
vergence of two developments: a gradual shift in the public function
of the American intellectual from engineer to ideologue, coinciding
with the ideological void suddenly created across the American polit-
ical spectrum by the mutually entailed collapse of communism and
obsolescence of cold war liberalism. Both developments have opened
America to the influence of European political thought, which main-
tains a lively engagement with Hegel.
Unfortunately, by caricaturing Hegel as little more than a cold-war
liberal, Fukuyama deprives him of much of his ability to fill the ideo-
logical void left in the cold war's wake. Part III shows that the liberal
values Fukuyama finds implicit in Hegel lose much of their content
when removed from the context of the cold war. Fukuyama claims
that an innate human drive for recognition, discovered by Hegel, has
dictated the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy over com-
munism. Yet Hegel warned that the demand for recognition could not
be met merely by freeing markets or limiting states. Recognition re-
quired not only private property, but also social insurance sustaining a
network of civil association. Moreover, Hegel warned, such a strategy
of insulating civil society from market competition could not be uni-
versalized without interfering with the functioning of the market.
Hence, Hegelian political theory suggests that recognition demands
more than cold war liberalism and occasions intractable conflict.
Rather than initiating the ideological innovation we will need to con-
front these challenges, The End of History denies its necessity.
Civil Society and Political Theory, though destined by its density
and bulk to be much less read, is significantly more responsive to the
normative restlessness of Fukuyama's readers. In this volume, Arato
and Cohen identify the collapse of communism with the revolt of what
Hegel called "civil society" against the state. Part IV explains this
revival of Hegel's concept by reference to a common frustration exper-
ienced by reform movements on both sides of the iron curtain. Both
movements reluctantly concluded that seizing the state was both im-
practicable and undesirable. Yet the emergence in Eastern Europe's
command-economy states of a private sector necessarily distinct from
the market refuted the cold war's premise that state and market were
exhaustive categories. To the West's dispirited reformers, Cohen and
Arato bring welcome tidings: the East's "civil society" strategy proves
that reform is possible outside the state.
8. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 25 (Frederick Engels ed. & Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling
trans., Charles H. Kerr & Company 1915) (1867).
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If Fukuyama pronounces the death of bipolarity in international
politics, then Cohen and Arato pronounce its death in domestic poli-
tics. In so doing they reassert the relevance of Hegel's emphasis on
association as the context for the recognition denied not only by state
control, but also by consumer "choice." Part V explicates Cohen and
Arato's strategy for reviving civil society, but reasserts Hegel's warn-
ing that the simultaneous sustenance of markets and civil society for
some may depend upon an international context in which these insti-
tutions are not available to all.
Hence, a weakness common to both books is that their appropria-
tion of Hegel is partial and Panglossian. Hegel was not only an ideal-
ist who thought the world was made by thought; he was also a realist
who knew that social contradiction, for all the artificiality of its ori-
gins, could not be wished away. Hegel, like Adam Smith before him
and Marx after him, viewed markets as at once liberatory and destruc-
tive. He saw a welfare state, mediated by a rich network of civil asso-
ciation, as an ingenious defense against the destructive tendencies of
markets, but one that could not be universalized. The nation-state
could deflect, but not eliminate, the corrosive force of a global market.
In turning to Hegel to explicate the overthrow of utopian Marxism, we
risk forgetting how much of Marx - and how little of his utopianism
- was anticipated by Hegel.
II. NOT THE END OF IDEOLOGY
In 1989 and 1990 enough popular periodicals to fill a long footnote
reported that an obscure official at the State Department had an-
nounced the end of history in the pages of a little known neoconserva-
tive journal. 9 What made this event newsworthy? Surely not the end
9. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, THE NATL. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3;
Allan D. Bloom et al. Responses to Fukuyama, THE NATL. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 19;
George F. Will, History's Last Word?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989, at 66; Richard Bernstein,
Judging 'Post-History,' The Theory to End All Theories, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, § 4, at 5;
Timothy Fuller et al., More Responses to Fukuyama, THE NATL. INTEREST, Fall 1989, at 93;
Michael Novak, Boredom, Virtue, and Democratic Capitalism, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 34;
John Elson, Has History Come to an End?, TIME, Sept. 4, 1989, at 57; Strobe Talbott, The Begin-
ning of Nonsense, TIME, Sept. 11, 1989, at 39; George Walden, Is the End of History Really
Nigh?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 14, 1989, at 20; Charles Krauthammer,... Is History History?,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1989, at A31; Time to Call History a Day?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 16,
1989, at 48; Bob Sipchen, D.C. Abuzz Over Theory That the End is Near, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1989, § V, at 1; Samuel P. Huntington, Repentl The End Is Not Near, WASH. POST, Sept. 24,
1989, at B3; M.G. Lord, What to Do When History Ends: Try Shopping, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24,
1989, at 9; Henry Allen, The End. Or Is It?: Francis Fukuyama and The Schism Over His Ism,
WASH. PoST, Sept. 27, 1989, at Cl; Rae Corelli, Stopping Time: Scholars Debate Whether His.
tory Has Ended, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 2, 1989, at 56; Les Firestein, The Trouble Was, History Kept
Piling Up, CH. TRIa., Oct. 2, 1989, § 1, at 15; Jonathan Alter, The Intellectual Hula Hoop: Why
the hyping of 'The End of History' says more about Washington than the theory itself NEWS-
WEEK, Oct. 9, 1989, at 39; James Atlas, What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying
It?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1989, § 6, at 38, 40; John Gray, The End of History - or of Liber-
alism?, NATL. REV., Oct. 27, 1989, at 33; Stephen Budiansky, The End is Not Near, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Oct. 30, 1989, at 26; Paul Blumberg, Is this the End?, NEWSDAY, Nov. 11,
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of the cold war which, though newsworthy enough, was, with the fall
of the Berlin Wall, plain for all to see. No, the man-bites-dog aspect of
the story was the official's celebration of the collapse of communism in
the millenarian language that Marxists might have used to celebrate
its triumph. While most Americans read the Eastern European rejec-
tion of communism as the ultimate refutation of Marx, Francis
Fukuyama saw it as the ultimate vindication of the thinker best known
to Americans as Marx' mentor, Hegel.
Although the oddity lay partly in Fukuyama's reclaiming Hegel
for capitalism, there was a deeper anomaly: For what, at its moment
of triumph, did capitalism need Hegel? Thus, the real oddity lay in
Fukuyama's effort to invoke capitalism in support of a tradition of
philosophical history more commonly associated with capitalism's
critique.
To appreciate fully this anomaly we have to go back a generation.
To the young scholars who peopled American universities in the wake
of World War II, the twin enemies of fascism and communism embod-
ied the dangers of ideology. Not the self-conscious aesthetes described
by Fitzgerald a generation earlier, 10 nor the restless beats Richard
Farifia would later evoke,II these were veterans, hardheaded practical
men, used to getting with the program, getting the job done, taking
orders, and taking charge.12 They took up posts as disciplined aca-
demics rather than intellectuals, convinced that theory merely excused
inaction, that ideology exploited inexperience, and that in a democ-
racy dissent implied desertion and endorsed dictatorship. They loved
conformity but scorned dogma. The global triumph of 'liberal democ-
racy, they confidently assumed, would mean the end of ideology.13
Symptomatic of ideology to the postwar American scholar was the
Europeans' anthropomorphizing of History as the vehicle of imper-
sonal social forces engaged in dialectical struggle on behalf of tran-
scendent ideals. Thus the related enterprises of social theory and
philosophy of history were ideological enterprises, rationalizing the
current sacrifice of individual liberty as necessary to the ultimate reali-
1989, at 1; End of History, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 13, 1989, at A18; Richard Bernstein, The End of
History, Explained for the Second Time, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1989, § 4, at 6; Francis
Fukuyama, Beyond the End of History: Still the Best Theory for the Bizarre Events of"89, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 10, 1989, at CI; Bob Sipchen, Last Words on 'End of History, 'Death of Novels, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, § E, at 1; Francis Fukuyama, A Reply to My Critics, THE NATL. INTER-
EST, Winter 1989-1990, at 21; Stephen Bronner, Reflections on the End of History, NEW POL.,
Summer 1990, at 111, 112; Alan M. Olson, Glasnost and Enlightenment, PHIL. TODAY, Summer
1990, at 99; Kenneth W. Thompson, History as End Point or New Beginnings, MEDITERRANEAN
Q., Winter 1990, at 111.
10. F. ScoTT FITZGERALD, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE (1920).
11. RICHARD FARI&A, BEEN DOwN So LONG IT LOOKS LIKE Up To ME (1966).
12. GARRY WILLS, NIXON AGONISTES: THE CRISIS OF THE SELF-MADE MAN 507-22
(1970).
13. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960).
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zation of a wholly chimerical collective freedom. 14 According to these
self-assured officer-professors, ideology was a peculiarly archaic and
European kind of softheadedness, a sort of old-world corruption from
which hardboiled Americans were blessedly free.15 For the consensus
historians Louis Hartz, 16 Daniel Boorstin, 17 and Arthur Schlesinger, 18
America had always been a Lockean state of nature - naturally abun-
dant, naturally egalitarian, naturally individualistic, and innately lib-
eral without need of philosophical reflection or political debate. To
theorize in the arcane rhetoric of critical philosophy was suspiciously
un-American. An honest man had no need for such finery - plain
folks are plain spoken.
Against this background, the most natural reading of the Berlin
Wall's fall was that the end of communism represented the long-
awaited end of ideology and, by extension, the bankrupt enterprise of
philosophical history. A global acceptance of liberalism, capitalism,
and democracy was imminent. No longer would politics engage mat-
ters of principle; no longer would leaders consign their opponents to
the ashheap of history. No longer deluded by ideology, everyone
would now proceed with the prosaic business of refining techniques for
implementing the new consensus.
The discrediting of ideology is not only a predictable American
reading of communism's collapse, it is very nearly Fukuyama's read-
ing. Hence the puzzle: Why announce the end of ideology as the tri-
umph of a particular ideology, liberal-democratic-capitalism? Why
describe the abandonment of teleological history as the telos toward
which all history tended? And why did this repackaging of the con-
ventional wisdom in the gaudy wrapper of idealist philosophy stir such
excitement? What, in short, does Fukuyama's succes-de-scandale re-
veal about the post-cold war predicament of political thought?
I think we can account for Fukuyama's rhetoric and its reception
in light of nine developments. Three involve changes in the American
political-intellectual milieu since the original articulation of the end-
of-ideology thesis. The remaining six are consequences of the collapse
of communism itself.
First and foremost, the events of 1989 came twenty years too late
to rescue the end-of-ideology thesis. Postwar universities had staked
an enormous claim to public investment as inculcators of consensus
14. Three expressions of this point of view are LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF
FREEDOM (1957); BERNARD YACK, THE LONGING FOR TOTAL REVOLUTION: PHILOSOPHIC
SOURCES OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT FROM ROUSSEAU TO MARX AND NIETZSCHE (1986); and
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). Berlin, though
not American, was widely read and admired here.
15. WILLS, supra note 12, at 507-17.
16. LouIs HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
17. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953).
18. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER (1949).
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and servants of an uncontroversial national interest. Science, lan-
guages, area studies, even psychology - all came to be seen as defense
research. But the very policy relevance of such research brought its
objectivity into question once consensus over the goals of public policy
broke down. As the Vietnam War eroded that consensus, draft-age
students increasingly saw universities not as public servants, but
merely as government agents. 19 The ensuing political confrontation
incubated challenges to the objectivity of every academic discipline.
Suddenly the pragmatism of Kuhn2° and Wittgenstein 21 could be in-
voked to undermine the epistemological claims of positivist social sci-
ence and the social authority of natural science. Consensus history
faced challenges on two fronts: intellectual historians advanced a new
interpretation of antebellum American political thought as ideological,
even paranoid,22 while social historians attempted to recover the sup-
pressed visions of history's losers.23
If even academic discourse is treated as inherently ideological, a
fortiori there can be no such thing as nonideological politics. Hence,
in an academic milieu where reference to "truth" has become an index
of naivet6, any attempted revival of the end-of-ideology thesis - no
matter how well confirmed by events - would have been dead on
arrival.
Second, while epistemological relativism drew most of its support
from the academic left, even advocates of free enterprise have long
since dispensed with the claim to be nonideological. Indeed, we can
understand the neoconservative movement as an imitative response to
the New Left's success in "infiltrating" popular culture. The intellec-
tual circles in which Fukuyama travels - his book jacket sports
blurbs from Charles Krauthammer, George Will, Irving Kristol, and
Alan Bloom - share the academic left's view of intellectual activity as
ideological advocacy. When a neoconservative describes markets as
the expression of an ideology, he means to dignify them as intellectu-
ally serious and principled.
19. This identification of universities with the machinery of war might seem paradoxical
given their function for draft-age students as safe havens from military service. Yet student
deferments themselves reflected the view that the university was performing a vital defense func-
tion. Moreover, as universities sought to control disruptive protest by expelling students -
thereby depriving them of student deferments - they became extensions of the Selective Service
System.
20. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
21. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
1953).
22. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1969);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
(1966); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
23. See PETER A. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 440-45 (1988). A key example is EUGENE D. GENO-
VESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1974).
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Third, if the "end-of-ideology thesis" is less academically respect-
able than it once was, philosophical history has become more respecta-
ble, so long as philosophy is now understood as ethics rather than
metaphysics. The stone first rippling the stagnant pond of postwar
American philosophy was Rawls' rejuvenation of Kantian Ethics.24
In one stroke, Rawls refuted the commonplace that liberalism had ob-
soleted normative philosophy and restored the relevance of the Kant-
ian critical tradition to English-speaking philosophy. Waves rippled
from this point of impact in three directions. First, in normative polit-
ical theory, neo-Kantian liberalism begat its neo-Hegelian communi-
tarian critique. 25 Second, even as neo-Kantian ethics were being
criticized, they were also being applied in the sphere of international
relations. 26 Third, in descriptive political science, Kant's prediction
that the proliferation of liberal democracy would yield "perpetual
peace" 27 got a second look.28 Perhaps it was only a matter of time
before this neo-Kantian philosophy of history would provoke a neo-
Hegelian response. In this sense, Fukuyama's pop-Hegelian self-help
24. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H. J. Paton
trans., Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 3d ed. 1964) (1785); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE (1971). Rawls' resuscitation of Kantian ethics affected legal scholarship most visibly in the
figure of Ronald Dworkin, but also through such diverse figures as Frank Michelman, Bruce
Ackerman, George Fletcher, and others. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1977); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967).
25. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984);
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrS OF JUSTICE (1982); ROBERTO M. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 185 (1985); Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379
(1981). Liberals have met this critique largely by incorporation rather than refutation. See WILL
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law,
Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685 (1992); John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985).
26. CHARLES R. BErrz, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979); AL-
LEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER
TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991); KYMLICKA, supra note 25; HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980); FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMAN-
ITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988).
27. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in KANT ON HISTORY 85 (Lewis W. Beck et al. ed.
& trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1795).
28. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 205, 323 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1151 (1986); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INL. L. 46 (1992); David Garnham, War-Proneness, War-Weariness and Regime Type: 1916-
1980, 23 J. PEACE RES. 279 (1986); R. J. Rummel, Libertarianism and International Violence, 27
J. Conf. Resol. 27 (1983); R. J. Rummel, On Vincent's View of Freedom and International Con-
flict, 31 INTL. STUD. Q. 113 (1987); Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992).
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manual for statesmen is the frothy crest of a more substantial swell
that has been building for twenty years.
In sum, postwar America has experienced a broad and gradual
transformation in the cultural function of the intellectual, from techni-
cal problem-solver to normative theory-builder. Yet the American in-
tellectual's difficulty is that she finds herself, in Pierre Schlag's
charming phrase, "normative and nowhere to go," 29 advocating causes
without rebels.
The Eastern European revolution has suddenly alleviated this defi-
cit of disorder. The lifting of the iron curtain seems like an invitation
for philosophers to don costumes and step onto the stage of world
history.
First, the sudden and simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union
and its satellites calls for global explanation by reference to large-scale
social forces. We expect an aggregation of individual decisions to lead
to incremental change. Steady erosion might precipitate sudden
change in a single country and, perhaps, influence the long-run sur-
vival prospects of regimes in other countries. But the simultaneous
collapse of nine regimes, the emergence by secession of twenty new
states, the reunification of the state that started two world wars, the
unification of Europe, the defusing of the nuclear confrontation that
has terrorized the world for four decades, the democratization of doz-
ens of states in Latin America and Asia - these are unquestionably
world-historical events demanding systematic explanation.30
Second, the exorcism of the communist bogeyman has cleared Eu-
ropean critical philosophy from suspicion of being an enemy agent,
and Fukuyama's neoconservative pop-Hegel signifies continental phi-
losophy's new innocuousness. No longer will every invocation of
Hegel and Kant be read as the coded plans for Soviet invasion. Now it
is possible to read European critical philosophy for its own sake and
judge it on its own terms.
Third, for those seeking to understand Germany and the "Central
European' 31 world emerging in its lengthening shadow, engagement
with the continental tradition is not just possible, but necessary. East-
ern European intellectuals conceived their struggle to liberate civil so-
ciety from the state in such Hegelian terms not only because that
29. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1990).
30. Fukuyama appropriately quotes Hegel's comments on the French Revolution:
We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves forward
in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of previous
representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are dissolving and collaps-
ing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself. Philosophy especially
has to welcome its appearance and acknowledge it ....
P. 39 (quoting G.W.F. Hegel, Lecture (Sept. 18, 1806)).




language suited their surroundings, but also because it was part of
their surroundings. It represented a way of reestablishing membership
in, and enlisting the support of, a European intellectual community.
The fragmentation of the Eastern bloc was as integrative as it was dis-
integrative, reflecting an impulse to join Europe economically, politi-
cally, and culturally.32 Fukuyama's millenarian message resonates
with the American mythology of manifest destiny; but his continental
idiom hints the end of the American century.
Fourth, the lifting of the iron curtain has enabled unprecedented
intellectual exchange between East and West, which will ultimately
prove to be a two-way street. It is tempting to view the squadrons of
American academics scrambling eastward to observe, advise, explain,
and endorse the new postcommunist regimes as conquering armies,
colonial governors sent to civilize the natives. But they come from a
country in the grip of governmental gridlock and political cynicism, a
country that has lost faith in the welfare state yet has imagined no
alternative to replace it. American academics are invited to Eastern
Europe to teach and prescribe, but they go in order to learn and listen.
The consequence of this migration is less likely to be the defeat of
European theory by American pragmatism than the Europeanization
of American social thought. Cohen and Arato's Left-Hegelian ac-
count of the Eastern European revolution represents this latter trend.
Fifth, channels of influence have opened for American intellectuals
in Eastern Europe largely because of the power of their East European
counterparts. The revolt of civil society against the state celebrated by
Cohen and Arato has delegitimized, if it has not always dis-
empowered, bureaucratic elites. Unlike familiar revolutionary move-
ments that mobilized armies and supplanted state authority as a result
of military struggle, the anticommunist revolution engendered no
counterbureaucracy. It was, to an unprecedented extent, a discursive
revolution, fortified by espresso rather than Molotov cocktails, fought
not with blows, but mit Schlag. Hence, almost in spite of themselves,
East European intellectuals find themselves sucked into the power vac-
uum they helped create, ironically envied by their pampered, prosper-
ous colleagues to the West.
A final reason for the post-cold war return of philosophy is its util-
ity here, as well as there. Contrary to the faith of the officer-profes-
sors, the circumstances in which politics can be reduced to technical
problem-solving are the exception rather than the rule. World War II
was such a circumstance, in which a solidarity unprecedented in
American history banished politics and joined Americans from Iowa
City to Iwo Jima to defeat fascism. After the war, Americans strug-
gled to sustain that nourishing solidarity by transferring their enmity
32. For more on this theme see Guyora Binder, The Casefor Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J.
INTL. L. (forthcoming 1993).
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to the red menace. The newly coined epithet "totalitarianism" eased
this transition by associating together ideologies of the left and the
right.33 It was in this prolonged war against totalitarianism that liber-
alism, democracy, and capitalism took on uncontroversial and
unanalyzed meaning as rallying cries.34 When a society's ends are
supplied by a foreign threat, ideology is unnecessary and military mo-
bilization supplants political mobilization. With the lifting of
America's long state of siege, however, social choice is no longer, to
paraphrase Michael Dukakis, about means alone, but about ends.
Now that we have made the world safe for liberalism, democracy, and
capitalism, we must decide what these fine phrases mean. In the inevi-
tably political work of deciding which rights will go with what forms
of public participation and representation and with what kind of mar-
ket, we will need a new birth - if not of ideology, at least of ideas.
Here the neoconservative Fukuyama, content to savor victory in
the last war, cannot help us. And here, insist neoradicals Cohen and
Arato, the cold war's real victors, the peoples of Eastern Europe, have
something to teach us.
III. NOT THE END OF POLITICS
This section explicates and critiques Fukuyama's claim that his-
tory is over. It shows that Fukuyama's faith in the necessity and
perpetuity of the present stems from a commitment to a static human
nature quite at odds with Hegel's historicism. Fukuyama's naturalism
expresses itself in an argument that all political conflict is behind us,
enabled by three rhetorical sleights of hand: (1) reading Hegel's dia-
33. Actually, the term totalitarianism seems to have been introduced by its enthusiasts as an
accolade. See Benito Mussolini, Speech of June 22, 1925, in 21 OPERA OMNIA 362 (1952-1963),
quoted in LEONARD SCHAPIRO, TOTALITARIANISM 13 (1971) ("Feroce Volunta totalitaria");
Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophical Basis of Fascism, 6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 290, 299 (1928) ("To-
talitarian scope of [Fascism]"); Carl Schmitt, quoted in SCHAPIRO, supra, at 13 (national social-
ism calls for "totalitarian state"). The term quickly became an epithet, however. For discussion
of its usage see SCHAPIRO, supra, at 13-15 and Benjamin R. Barber, Conceptual Foundations of
Totalitarianism, in CARL J. FRIEDRICH ET AL., TOTALITARIANISM IN PERSPECTIVE: THREE
VIEvs 3-20 (1969). The most influential formulations, linking Naziism and Communism, are
those of Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF To-
TALITARIANISM 305-479 (1951); CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
DEMOCRACY 1 (1941) (parallel between Naziism and Communism); id. at 170-71,260, 263, 291,
343 ("Totalitarianism" described); CARL J. FRIEDRICH & ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITAR-
IAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1956); Carl J. Friedrich, The Evolving Theory and Prac-
tice of Totalitarian Regimes, in TOTALITARIANISM IN PERSPECTIVE, supra at 123; Carl J.
Friedrich, The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society, in TOTALITARIANISM 41 (Carl J.
Friedrich ed., 1964).
34. Bruce Ackerman makes a similar point in inverted form:
Given the Marxists' aim, it made sense for them to use capitalism as an umbrella term.
After all, they were trying to convince us that all non-Communist systems were fundamen-
tally bad. But it is wrong for liberal revolutionaries to carry over the capitalist label into
their own thinking. Rather than rejecting capitalism for communism, we must recognize
that there are many capitalisms, some much better than others.
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 34-35 (1992).
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lectic as a movement toward agreement rather than understanding, (2)
finding agreement on values of such indeterminate scope as to encom-
pass the entire political spectrum, and (3) confining politics to the de-
bate over the organization of government rather than that of society or
culture.
A. The End of History?
Fukuyama shares the conventional wisdom that capitalism is the
most efficient system for allocating resources and liberal democracy is
the political regime that best recognizes the dignity of all citizens.
What sets Fukuyama apart from the mainstream are his views that
these regimes are preferred because they reflect truths of human na-
ture; that their truth makes their acceptance as inevitable as the ac-
ceptance of scientific claims; that the mechanism by which human
nature compels the acceptance of capitalism, liberalism, and democ-
racy is the struggle for recognition first conceived by Hegel; that the
widespread acceptance of liberalism, capitalism, and democracy will
eliminate most international conflict; and that such peace is what
Hegel meant by the end of history.
Fukuyama's starting point is Hegel's famous dialectic of master
and slave in the Phenomenology of Mind (pp. 146-52). Two men en-
counter each other in a state of nature and engage in a struggle to the
death, not over any natural good like food, but for the already cultural
value of prestige, or recognition. Realizing that the death of either
antagonist precludes the recognition of both, one submits to the other.
Yet the victor, Hegel argued, still cannot be satisfied with recognition
wrung from a helpless captive - meaningful recognition can only
come from one recognized in return. The slave, on the other hand,
begins the arduous process of winning recognition for himself and the
master by mastering himself in the self-discipline of labor.35
History, according to Fukuyama's Hegel, is the narrative of move-
ment from the disequilibrium of unequal recognition to the stability of
equal recognition (pp. 192-98). Yet the motor of history is thymos, the
individual desire to maximize recognition Hegel depicted in his origi-
nal allegory of the fight to the death. As there is strength in numbers,
the pursuit of this individual desire leads to the dominance of military
elites in society. Rivalry among elites engenders the competitive mo-
bilization of all available resources for war. This competition leads to
scientific innovation, a cumulative process because the genie of knowl-
edge cannot be stuffed back into the bottle (pp. 73-75, 82-88). The
competitive mobilization of resources for war also leads to innovation
in what we might call, following Foucault, "technologies of power."
35. HEGEL, supra note 1, at 229-40.
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Ironically, then, we owe society's movement toward the unheroic val-
ues of economic and bureaucratic rationality to a struggle for honor.
More specifically, argues Fukuyama, military competition for rec-
ognition propels society toward capitalism and democracy. Why is
capitalism historically necessary? For Marx, who coined the term,
capitalism meant free alienability of labor, commodity production for
private accumulation of wealth, and sufficient accumulation of wealth
to enable industrialization. 36 Yet Marx' assumption that industrializa-
tion required free alienability of labor and private accumulation of
capital was ironically refuted by the success of communist states in
developing industry.37 Hence, "capitalism" proved to be a mythic be-
ing long before its triumph.
Fukuyama's capitalism seems to mean nothing more than alloca-
tion of resources by competitive pricing (pp. 44, 90-94). Even though
markets long preceded industrialization, in Fukuyama's eyes they
have become necessary only with the advent of the postindustrial in-
formation economy. The production of complex, computerized tech-
nology involving thousands of component parts requires cost
calculations beyond the capacity of central planners. Thus, only in the
age of Star Wars have markets demonstrated their military superiority
(pp. 75-76, 92-96).
To account fully for the inevitability of markets, however,
Fukuyama argues that we have to factor in the inevitable development
of democracy. Industrialization, enabling the mass production of
weaponry, advantages the military elite willing to widen the circle of
recognition and arm the masses. Recruiting the remaining populace
into the industrial-commercial economy needed to sustain modem
warfare requires the inculcation of basic literacy, a common language,
work discipline, future-orientation, and all the other traits we associate
with modernity. With the resulting advent of a citizen army, universal
education, widespread literacy, national circulation of commodities
and currency, a popular press, and an informed, articulate public opin-
ion, we find ourselves in the nation-state (pp. 267-69).
Conscripting, coordinating, and motivating the efforts of entire
populations, nation-states cannot long avoid empowering and consult-
ing them (pp. 115-17, 205). Because the nation-state relies only on the
mobilized portion of its populace, it tends to condition political recog-
nition on participation in the national culture that enables mobiliza-
36. See GERALD A. COHEN, KARL MARx's THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENCE 64-69, 80-
83 (1978); Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1985, 2002 (1991).
37. We might add that industrialization preceded the full freeing of laborers in England by
100 years. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR 115, 243 n.36 (1991)
(noting that criminal enforcement of labor contracts persisted in Britain until the 1870s). Brit-
ain's first heavy industry, the Scottish coal mines, used laborers who were bound for life, bought
and sold. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1770-1823, at 490 (1975) (discussion of case involving Scottish colliers).
1503May 1993]
Michigan Law Review
tion. Although more inclusive than the federal state, the nation-state
is not all-inclusive. By identifying with a victorious nation, every citi-
zen can be recognized as a master. Yet, because the majoritarian mas-
tery to which nationalists aspire is exclusive of cultural minorities, it is
still, Fukuyama asserts, instable (p. 266). Only liberal democracy, by
replacing the desire for superior recognition with the desire for equal
recognition, enables mutual recognition among fully democratic
states, thereby bringing the thymotic dialectic to an end (pp. 200-01).
What is the link between democracy and markets? With the de-
mocratization of government, argues Fukuyama, government plan-
ning becomes less efficient. Fukuyama acknowledges that
authoritarian states in East Asia have implemented highly successful
industrial policies (pp. 123-24). But drawing on public choice theory,
Fukuyama argues that majoritarian public investment and pricing de-
cisions are likely to be redistributive rather than wealth-maximizing
(pp. 124-25). Thus, not only does military competition democratize
states, it also moves democracies from centrally planned to market
economies. Fukuyama points to recent worldwide trends toward de-
mocratization and privatization to confirm his intuitions.
When "liberal democracy" becomes sufficiently widespread, how-
ever, military competition ceases. By eliminating the desire for recog-
nition as superior, Fukuyama insists, liberal democracy eliminates the
thymotic motivation for war and so switches off the motor of history
(pp. xx, 260).
Here Fukuyama offers a variation on the standard argument that
popular majorities will not agree to bear the brunt of wars for the
aggrandizement of military elites. Recognizing that nationalism iden-
tifies popular majorities as the military elites who stand to benefit from
the exploitation of other nations, Fukuyama insists only that suffi-
ciently liberal popular majorities will not go to war. As evidence of
the pacifying effects of liberal sentiments, Fukuyama cites "a steadily
decreasing tolerance for violence, death," and "casualties in the war,"
as well as the reduced brutality of punishment, particularly in enforc-
ing military discipline (p. 261). He cites the claims of Michael Doyle
and other neo-Kantian theorists of international relations that, as an
empirical matter, no liberal democracies have ever fought each
other.38
Finally, Fukuyama reasons that, with the dissipation of thymotic
motives for war, material incentives will become more important.
These incentives, however, are likely to discourage warfare in the fu-
ture. With the development of a technology-intensive economy,
Fukuyama argues, the costs of war outweigh its benefits. Military
technology is prohibitively expensive, while the land and population
38. See supra sources cited in note 28.
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acquired by military conquest add little to the conquering nation's
wealth. Even raw materials are probably acquired more cheaply by
purchase than conquest (pp. 261-62). War, Fukuyama concludes, has
become economically obsolete and is fast becoming thymotically su-
perfluous as well.
In the coming posthistorical era, Fukuyama predicts, almost all
states will be pacific liberal democracies, protecting private property,
permitting allocation of resources by markets, albeit with varying de-
grees of regulation, public investment, and welfare. Roughly similar
politically and economically, the democracies will remain culturally
diverse (p. 233). Borrowing a page from such neoconservatives as
Glazer, Moynihan, 39 and Sowell,4° Fukuyama expects these cultural
differences will determine the relative wealth of nations - those de-
voted to the Protestant ethic or its Confucian analogue will prosper,
Fukuyama seems sure (pp. xix, 234, 237-38). But cultural competi-
tion, Fukuyama concludes, is not political conflict and so has no
history.41
Let's evaluate Fukuyama's argument: Are universal capitalism,
liberal democracy, and world peace inevitable? Not on the basis of
Fukuyama's reasoning and not on Hegel's authority. Fukuyama's ar-
guments for the inevitability of universal capitalism and universal
peace contradict each other. He shows the obsolescence of political
debate over capitalism, liberalism, and democracy only by defining
each so vaguely that they are consistent with any plausible policy pre-
scription. Hegel, by contrast, saw democracy and markets as poten-
tially contradictory and judged this tension an intractable source of
nationalist feeling and international conflict.
B. Not the End of Ideological Conflict
Consider first Fukuyama's argument for the inevitability of mar-
kets, capitalism to you. By his account, the economic superiority of
markets becomes manifest surprisingly late in the day - in states al-
ready democratic or in authoritarian states confronting military rivals
with postindustrial economies. The first difficulty with his idealist
analysis is its inability to explain the premature appearance of mar-
kets. A second difficulty is the inherent perversity of what amounts to
a claim that the economic superiority of markets was revealed by their
ability to produce Star Wars. Perverse first, because there is still no
evidence Star Wars would have worked; second, because it is not clear
we can afford it; and third, because we would be hard put to find a
39. NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (2d ed.
1970).
40. THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS (1975).
41. P. 61 (history is competition "between socio-economic systems").
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more socialized, subsidized, centrally planned, and inefficient sector of
the American economy than military technology.
Even assuming that communism collapsed because of the inability
of planned economies to close the microcircuitry gap, this hardly
proves the historical inevitability of whatever Fukuyama means by
capitalism. Because economic performance matters only as a means to
military victory in Fukuyama's idealist analysis, the case for the neces-
sity of capitalism depends upon the accident of postindustrial technol-
ogy arriving before perpetual peace. If democratization had
eliminated international military competition before the advent of the
information age, democracies would have had no thymotic compul-
sion to develop postindustrial technology or to maximize the efficiency
of their economies.
Is there perhaps some reason why the spread of democracy must
await the spread of capitalism? Democracy was obviously possible
before the information age, but perhaps the postindustrial technology
developed by capitalist economies nevertheless facilitates democracy.42
Much might be made of the role of fax machines in thwarting the
Communists' attempted coup in the Soviet Union. Yet high technol-
ogy has an antidemocratic aspect as well, beyond its obvious utility in
surveillance. Just as industrialization fostered democracy by making
the masses militarily and economically valuable, postindustrialization
may render democracy redundant by confining production - and de-
struction - to a technocratic elite.
If expensive technology does not necessarily democratize society,
perhaps the accumulation of wealth in private hands encourages de-
mocracy by creating plural centers of power. Jeane Kirkpatrick's no-
torious claim that authoritarian right-wing dictatorships were more
vulnerable to democratization than totalitarian socialist dictatorships
may be so understood.43 Yet Fukuyama rightly concedes that the
broad distribution of wealth is more important than its invulnerability
to state control in sowing the seeds of democracy. Socialist regimes in
Nicaragua and Peru prepared the ground for democracy by redistrib-
uting land,44 and the first Soviet bloc states to move toward reform,
Poland and Hungary, had among the most egalitarian distributions of
wealth in the world.45 At the same time, military regimes serving at
the pleasure of private concentrations of wealth hardly constitute
pluralism.
42. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
43. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at
34, 37.
44. For Peru, see p. 120.
45. The ratio of the percentage of GNP earned by the top 20% and that earned by the
bottom 20% was 3.0 in Hungary and 3.6 in Poland, the lowest reported. U.N. Development
Programme, Human Development Report 1991, tbl. 17, at 152-53, tbl. 38, at 186.
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One might, taking inspiration from Hegel, argue that state control
of society precludes the private association needed to form democratic
will.46 But then one would have to ask, as Cohen and Arato do,
whether placing society at the mercy of unrestricted market forces
does not equally preclude sociability (p. 24). That perpetual peace
must await global democratization in no way implies that perpetual
peace must await global capitalism.
Even if perpetual peace required the prior spread of capitalism,
that would not imply capitalism's permanence. Once perpetual peace
has been achieved, Fukuyama's thymotic analysis gives democracies
no compelling reason to retain markets. It is not enough to argue that
the genie of high technology cannot be restored to the bottle, since the
motivation to deploy the genie has, ex hypothesi, disappeared.
Fukuyama's claims for the military necessity of capitalism and the pa-
cific destiny of democracy must ultimately collide, "necessitating"
only an indeterminate future.
At this point, Fukuyama has a tempting reply available, but one
that reveals the essentially circular quality of his argument. The
tempting reply is that perpetual peace follows the global spread not
just of democracy, but of liberal democracy. And liberal democracy
by definition requires capitalism.
Now the latter statement is true if we accept Fukuyama's vacuous
definitions of these terms. Fukuyama, as we have seen, uses capitalism
to mean nothing more than the tolerance of some market pricing and
some private property. Liberalism he defines as limited to the protec-
tion of property, worship, and speech (pp. 42-44). If capitalism means
nothing more than the protection of some property, and liberalism
protects property, than ipso facto liberal democracy must be capitalist.
But neither of these definitions suffices for Fukuyama's purposes.
He is out to convince us that real debate over political values is over
because the combination of capitalism, liberalism, and democracy
uniquely satisfies the human craving for equal recognition. Capital-
ism, appearing as an economic weapon in Fukuyama's narrative of the
combat for recognition, must be allocatively efficient. Liberalism, ap-
pearing as a corrective to the intolerant, chauvinist tendencies of de-
mocracy, must be antidiscriminatory. And democracy, representing
recognition, must be meaningfully participatory. And these different
purposes place Fukuyama's three principles at odds, guaranteeing a
future of controversy and contingency.
Thus Fukuyama's bland syllogism finding capitalism included by
definition in liberalism is vitiated by the ambiguity of property. When
we associate capitalism with the protection of property, we think pri-
marily of the right to alienate or "market" property that enables its
46. SHLOMo AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 161-67 (1972).
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efficient allocation. But when we associate liberalism with the protec-
tion of property, we may be more concerned with securing the right to
acquire and enjoy property. Indeed, Hegel saw property as a medium
for the expression of personality and therefore crucial to realizing the
individual dignity we often associate with liberalism.47 Needless to
say, our ability to invest property with personality may be undermined
rather than enhanced by its alienability. 48
In any case, liberalism's prominent role in Fukuyama's thymotic
narrative rests on its commitment to equality rather than property.
And by limiting "private discrimination" and redistributing wealth,
the vindication of equality may well collide with the protection of
property. Fukuyama attempts to cabin this conflict by declaring liber-
alism committed to the elimination of only "conventional" inequality
- unequal treatment - rather than "natural" inequality, or inequal-
ity of condition (pp. 290-91). Yet fully eliminating conventional
sources of inequality would require eliminating inherited wealth, for-
bidding discretionary gifts of human capital ranging from education to
affection, and defining and rewarding achievement without regard to
discretionary - and hence "conventional" - consumer preferences.
So even Fukuyama's equal treatment principle, unreservedly applied,
threatens to eliminate private disposition and market allocation of re-
sources. Moreover, Fukuyama admits that liberalism is also compati-
ble with an unspecified measure of pure redistribution aimed at
correcting "natural" inequality (pp. 44, 291-93).
Next, consider the potential tension between democracy and mar-
kets. Fukuyama defines democracy as the right to vote and participate
in politics (p. 43). We typically view at least some political participa-
tion rights - voting rights paradigmatically - as subject to restraints
on alienation and accumulation. 49 To the extent we view any entitle-
ment as crucial to political participation - education, service in the
military, ownership of productive property in the republican tradition
- we may wish to place them outside the market.50 Similarly, to the
extent we view any allocative decision as political, we may wish to
take it outside the market. To that end, some have argued that the
workplace is within the domain of politics and should be managed
democratically.
Finally, recall that, in Fukuyama's narrative, liberal democracy is
just a means to maximize recognition. Yet Hegel emphasized the ten-
47. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 41-71 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1967) (1820).
48. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theo-
rem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 957 (1982).
49. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1350-56 (1991).




dency of markets to frustrate recognition by eroding the communities
within which recognition must necessarily occur.51 He suggested the
need for associations - intermediate between the individual and the
state - to confer social identity on individuals, aggregate them into
politically effective and articulate interest groups, and provide social
insurance.52 Social insurance itself is an accumulation restraint,5 3
while membership in an association may involve noncommodifiable
entitlements. Thus, recognition is a fourth value endorsed by
Fukuyama that may justify limiting the alienation and accumulation
of property.
The emergent ideological "consensus" apparently requires com-
mitment to the potentially incompatible values of allocative efficiency,
personal dignity, equality, democracy, and community. Whether
Fukuyama's talismanic label of liberal democracy is capacious enough
to encompass all these values is ultimately beside the point. The im-
portant point is that different resolutions of the tensions among these
values would yield vastly different societies, so that important ques-
tions of policy and principle remain ours to debate and to decide.
C. Not the End of International Conflict
If ideological conflict is not yet obsolete, neither is international
conflict. The malleability of Fukuyama's concept of liberal democracy
fatally weakens his empirical claim that liberal democracies cooperate,
while his prediction of a universal liberal alliance rests on a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of Hegel's philosophical history. If international
conflict is driven by the yearning for recognition, Hegel gives us no
warrant for expecting the universal satisfaction of that yearning. Even
if liberal democracies do tend to ally, Hegel denied that any such alli-
ance could become universal.
Fukuyama's empirical case for perpetual peace relies on the pro-
gressive development of humanitarian values and the rarity of war be-
tween liberal democracies. The first datum need not detain us.
Insofar as it is a recent development, humanitarian law is clearly a
response to the vastly more destructive consequences of warfare in the
modern era. War now involves more soldiers, more civilians in sup-
port, and more productive enterprises designated for destruction as
military targets by more potent weaponry than ever.
The heart of Fukuyama's empirical case for optimism is the com-
51. G.W.F. HEGEL, JENAER REALPHILOSOPHIE: DIE VORLESUNGEN VON 1803-1804, at
232-39 (1932) (destructive effect of market on community); HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 253, 255
(community required for recognition).
52. HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 302, 303, 308, § 290 add. (political voice); §§ 245, 253
(social insurance).
53. Simon, supra note 49, at 1346. Often social insurance is inalienable as well. See, eg., 42
U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988) (preventing assignability of future social security benefits).
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monly voiced claim that liberal democracies, though belligerent to-
ward their ideological opponents, have never fought one another. This
claim faces three related difficulties. First, to determine whether lib-
eral democrats cooperate we must distinguish liberal democracy from
other ideologies, which Fukuyama seems unable to do. Is liberalism
about consumer choice, equal opportunity, or freedom of expression?
Some commentators classify Wilhelmine Germany as a liberal democ-
racy,54 while Fukuyama implies that even contemporary Germany
might not qualify as liberal because it punishes hate speech.55 How do
we classify semisocialist Sweden? Pseudorevolutionary Rumania? Be-
leaguered but bloodthirsty Croatia? The once and future communist
regime in Lithuania?5 6 Fujimori's intermittent dictatorship in Peru?
What about the popularly elected socialisms of Allende, Arbenz, and
Ortega, all subverted by the United States? 57 If we laud these as lib-
eral democracies, can we save the perpetual peace claim by classifying
the extralegal American responses as departures from democracy?
Second, as the example of Sandinista Nicaragua reminds us, the
claim that liberal democracies do not go to war has a circular quality.
Inasmuch as warring states inevitably violate humanitarian law by
slaughtering civilians, usually suspend civil liberties while delegating
political authority to the military, and often face internal subversion,
war makes states less liberal and less democratic. In addition, war is a
forensic activity, frequently placing the previous liberality or democ-
racy of contending governments in controversy. No state perfectly
embodies its own utopian rhetoric, and no situation exposes imperfec-
tions so well as war.
Third, if we adopt a sufficiently restrictive definition of liberal de-
mocracy to exclude any states that have fought each other, we end up
with too small a data set to exclude rival hypotheses. Robert Mear-
sheimer points out that the last half century of peace among major
industrial powers can be as well explained by nuclear deterrence as by
the prevalence of liberal democracy, while before World War II liberal
democracies were too few and too new to generalize about.5 8
54. John J. Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Aug. 1990, at 35, 47.
55. Pp. 42-43 (concerns about racism, sexism, and homophobia as political threat to liberal
rights); p. 294 (freedom of speech and press essential to liberalism, although qualified by excep-
tion for matters "plainly affect[ing] the welfare of the whole community"). See Donald P. Kom-
mers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 685-86 (1980).
56. Celestine Bohlen, A New Democracy Votes Communist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at
A20; Eleanor Randolph, Lithuanian Communists Gain Legislative Control, WASH. POST, Nov.
17, 1992, at A27.
57. See Diana Meyers, Kant's Liberal Alliance, in POLITICAL REALISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL MORALITY 212, 216 (Kenneth Kipnis & Diana Meyers eds., 1987); Mearsheimer, supra
note 54, at 47.
58. Mearsheimer, supra note 54, at 46-47; see also Jack Vincent, Freedom and International
Conflict: Another Look 31 INTL. STUD. Q. 103 (1987).
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Even if Fukuyama's empirical claim about the tendency of liberal
democracies to cooperate were acceptable, it would not by itself imply
the obsolescence of international conflict. This conclusion depends on
the predictions that liberal democracy will become universal and that
liberal democracies will continue to cooperate when they no longer
have common enemies. Fukuyama bases these bets on his teleological
reading of Hegel's dialectic of recognition. Fukuyama understands
Hegel to depict history as a movement from asymmetric, unequal, ex-
clusive recognition to reciprocal, equal, universal recognition. Equat-
ing liberal democracy with recognition, Fukuyama reasons that it
must become universal in scope. With universal liberal democracy,
the drama of history will conclude and the thymotic motive for war
will vanish.
The difficulty is that Hegel was aware of Kant's proposal that a
universal liberal alliance could banish war, and he emphatically re-
jected it:
Perpetual peace is often advocated as an ideal towards which humanity
should strive. With that end in view, Kant proposed a league of
monarchs to adjust differences between states, and the Holy Alliance was
meant to be a league of much the same kind. But the state is an individ-
ual, and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a
number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individ-
ual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.59
Far from predicting perpetual peace, Hegel thought it inherently
impossible.
Where does Fukuyama go wrong?
Fukuyama's problems begin with a common misunderstanding of
the Hegelian dialectic as a secular eschatology, the itinerary for a jour-
ney to a promised land. In light of the instrumental rationality that
pervades experience in a technologically advanced society, we expect
any philosophy of history to narrate the implementation of a plan.
This view of history also resonates with the Augustinian dualism
transmitted by Christianity. Against the background of Christian es-
chatology, if we learn that Hegel is an idealist, we understand him to
explain temporal events by reference to ideas that are eternal and tran-
scendental, something like a design in the mind of God.60 The secular-
59. HEGEL, supra note 47, at § 324 add.
60. Pp. 56, 58 (declaiming that the concept of History, as used by Hegel, implies progress,
which in turn implies a purpose or end that provides a fixed standard of value). Hegel easily
lends himself to such a reading. Seemingly endorsing the idea that history is the unfolding of a
preordained plan, we find Hegel telling his students that "Reason, in its most concrete represen-
tation, is God. God governs the world. The actual working of His government, the carrying out
of His plan is the history of the world." G.W.F. HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY 47 (Robert S.
Hartman trans., Liberal Arts Press 1953) (1837). In reading such a passage, however, we must
be careful not to ascribe to Hegel an Augustinian notion of God or a Platonic notion of reason.
Rather than likening history to these static and transcendental categories, Hegel means to import
dynamism and immanence into our conceptions of God and Reason by likening them to history.
He introduces the analogy of reason to God as frankly heuristic, strategic, and ironic, drawing
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ized version of God's plan is natural law, while our instrumentalism
suggests an image of human nature as a universal desire or need.
Thus, both religious tradition and modem science accustom us to rep-
resenting history as the progressive satisfaction of a naturally occur-
ring desire. Fukuyama interprets Hegel accordingly, as a prophet of
utopia, an anti-Marx who credits capitalism with the fulfillment of
human nature and the transcendence of all discontent.
Unlike Marx' material dialectic, however, Hegel's does not lead us
to the promised land of utopia. 61 His is an integrative movement of
mind toward the comprehension, rather than the extinction, of con-
flict. For Hegel conflict is not an impediment to the realization of
human nature: it is the enabling condition for the creative striving
that makes us human. Humanity's struggle for recognition reaches no
conclusion; there is no pastoral retirement awaiting us at the end of
history.
Nor is Hegel's dialectic a prophecy.62 It is an interpretive theory,
aimed at finding the meaning of an ever-lengthening past in light of an
ever-changing present. Hegel's idealism is no Augustinian dualism in
which ideas direct the players from offstage. 63 Not directors of the
course of history, ideas are the course of history, intelligible after the
the historical connection of the thought that Reason rules the world with another form of it,
well known to us - that of religious truth: that the world is not abandoned to chance and
external accident but controlled by Providence. ... I do not make any demand on your
belief in the principle announced; but I think I may appeal to this belief in its religious form
On the other hand, a difference, indeed an opposition, now appears between this faith
and our principle .... [Tjhis faith .. is not followed up in definite application to the
whole, the comprehensive course of world history.... This definiteness of Providence is
usually called its plan. Yet this very plan is supposed to be hidden from our view; indeed,
the wish to recognize it is deemed presumption.
Id. at 14-15. On one level, Hegel is borrowing the authority of religion to win a suspension of
disbelief for the claims of speculative philosophy. On a second level, he is using irony to shame
his lazy, skeptical undergraduates into working at the philosophy of history, by pointing out their
credulity when it comes to religious mysteries which, because taken on faith, entail no further
thought. On a third level, however, he is subverting the conventional view that history's plan is
known even to God in advance of its unfolding. Hegel defines God as "wisdom endowed with
infinite power which realizes its own aim," id. at 15, and reason similarly as "the power capable
of actualizing itself." Id. at 47. Yet because ideas only fully exist when they become actual -
hence Hegel's famous identification of the actual and the rational - reason is not a blueprint for
history, but history itself. By extension God, or Spirit, is also the rational order immanent in
history. What are "the means... Spirit uses for actualizing its concept"? "[I]t is the activity of
the subjects in whom Reason is present as their substantial essence in itself, but still obscure and
concealed from them." Id. at 48. In short, Spirit is the order created by the aggregate meaning-
making of human beings intelligible after the fact.
61. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 419 (1975) (observing that Hegel rejected the utopian
ideal of "total participation" that Rousseau and Marx embraced).
62. Id. at 460.
63. Since ideas do not transcend, they also cannot precede, their concrete expression. For
modern elaborations of Hegel's point about the fusion of intuition and expression, see R.G. Col-
lingwood, Art as Expression, in A MODERN BOOK OF ESTHETICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 90 (Melvin
Rader ed., 4th ed. 1973), and Benedetto Croce, Intuition and Expression, in A MODERN BOOK
OF ESTHETICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 75 (Melvin Rader ed., 4th ed. 1973).
Post-Totalitarian Politics
factA4 For Hegel history is created by the collective meaningmaking
of human beings that constitutes Spirit, but not according to any pre-
existing design. 65
Fukuyama's misidentification of Hegel with Marx' utopianism dis-
torts the crucial allegory of master and slave. Fukuyama misinterprets
Hegel's demonstration of the failure of nonreciprocal recognition as a
demonstration of the failure of exclusive recognition. In the two-per-
son world of Hegel's fable, nonreciprocity is identical to nonuniversal-
ity. But, in the real world, these are not the same and, as
commentators have noted,66 there is nothing inherently futile about
reciprocal recognition within an exclusive elite. Hegel's conception of
recognition in fact requires exclusion. We can never be directly appre-
hended in all our uniqueness: recognition is always mediated by a so-
cial identity that joins us with some and differentiates us from others.67
If one lesson of Hegel's allegory of master and slave is the empti-
ness of nonreciprocal recognition, another is the emptiness of recogni-
tion that is coerced rather than earned. Recognition is valued only
when conferred for some socially valued accomplishment. Here again,
Fukuyama jumps to utopian conclusions, reasoning that, since coerced
recognition is dissatisfying, war serves no thymotic function.
Although war cannot satisfy the desire for recognition, Hegel saw it as
an inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for recognition in a world in
which opportunities for socially valued accomplishment are tragically
scarce. The resulting competition for these scarce opportunities drives
modem states into war.68
Socially valuable labor, Hegel reasoned, requires access to re-
sources. In this way, the institutions of property and contract can fa-
cilitate self-expression. 69 Yet, the aggregate effect of individuals'
efforts to seek social recognition for their uses of property is a market
for its exchange in which they paradoxically feel anonymous and help-
less. Following Adam Smith, Hegel observed that commerce tended
to divide labor and concentrate capital, leading ultimately to techno-
logical innovation and automation. The resulting decrease in demand
for labor, Hegel anticipated, would mean not only declining wages and
working conditions, but also reduced opportunities for recognition.70
Technological innovation threatens recognition by displacing
64. HEGEL, supra note 47, at 12-13.
65. TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 419-20.
66. See, eg., ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 97-101 (1982).
67. TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 447-48.
68. See GUYORA BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION: THE DIA-
LECTIC OF DUPLICITY 81-84 (1988).
69. HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 41-53 (property as medium of self-expression); §§ 72-81
(contract).
70. HEGEL, supra note 51, at 232-39.
May 19931 1513
Michigan Law Review
workers in two senses. First, by rendering workers redundant, techno-
logical innovation eliminates opportunities for earning recognition.
Second, by inviting the rapid reallocation of capital and labor, techno-
logical innovation destroys the communities of work and residence
that confer recognition on individuals. 71 Deprived of social identities,
individuals have no way to formulate their interests and pursue them
collectively, so that the market undermines democracy. Finally, by
undermining the democratic legitimacy of the state, the market can
threaten the security of property and so self-destruct.
Because Hegel saw that the market included thymotic costs that
Fukuyama leaves out of his account of capitalism, he saw the need for
corrective institutions that Fukuyama leaves out of his definition of
liberal democracy. To counteract the thymotic as well as the eco-
nomic burdens of unemployment, Hegel proposed a program of public
works. 72 To replace the traditional communities of recognition dis-
rupted by market forces, Hegel proposed a network of intermediate
associations - guilds, professions, and the like - to educate, to foster
and to sustain identity, to spread risk, and to formulate political will. 73
In an effort to counteract the anonymity and ruthless competition of
liberal society, Hegel anticipated the macroeconomic strategies of the
modem welfare state and resuscitated some of the corporatism of the
ancien regime.
These corrective institutions are not costless, however. Hegel wor-
ried that public employment will cause overproduction, driving down
the prices of privately produced goods and further undermining the
economic and thymotic status of other workers.74 Crises of underem-
ployment and overproduction lead to colonial adventures aimed at de-
veloping foreign markets for excess workers and goods.75 Meanwhile,
intermediate associations, in order to play their stabilizing social role,
must also be protected against market dislocations. This requires pro-
tection against not only domestic but also foreign competition. Each
of Hegel's strategies for sustaining recognition thus forces the state
into conflict with other nations.
The resulting conflict need not be universal because alliances can
be mutually beneficial; but such alliances can never be universal.
Hegel correctly grasped the structure of international relations that
would prevail for the century following Waterloo - mutual recogni-
tion and peace among a small club of colonial powers underwritten by
71. HEGEL, supra note 47, at §§ 197-98.
72. Id. at § 245.
73. AvINERI, supra note 46, at 161-75; HEGEL, supra note 47, §§ 252, 253, 303, 308, 290
add.; TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 437, 443.
74. HEGEL, supra note 47, at § 245.
75. Id. §§ 246, 248 add.
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the nonrecognition and exploitation of the rest of the world.76 Karl
Polanyi argued persuasively that, as more Europeans joined political
life between 1848 and 1914, they erected barricades of "social insur-
ance" and "protection" that eventually brought the market to a halt,
precipitating a world war and a quarter century of economic crisis.
77
Perhaps with the end of the cold war, we are once again entering a
period of great power amity, Kant's liberal alliance rather than Met-
ternich's Holy Alliance. But as long as the contradiction between
market alienation and recognition remains unresolved, we dare not as-
sume that such amity will be universal.78
Fukuyama is able to prophesy universal amity only because he
blinds himself to this contradiction between commerce and recogni-
tion. The only cost of markets he is willing to acknowledge is the
material inequality they engender, not the feelings of anonymity and
ineffectuality, nor their effects on political participation. The only is-
sue he regards as political is the extent of governmental redistribution
of wealth. Hence, Fukuyama silently relegates all questions regarding
the organization of work, association, the family, childcare, education,
communications, and urban space to the "sub-political... domain of
culture and of society" (p. 213). Movements to reform any of these
institutions, no matter how sweeping, therefore cannot count as radi-
cal challenges to liberalism (p. 293).
Yet for Hegel, Fukuyama's ostensible mentor, this supposedly
"sub-political" realm of culture and society is where identity is con-
ferred and recognized. It is in the realm of culture and society that
individual and national interests are formulated, and governments le-
gitimized or discredited. No institutions play a more fundamental role
in making us what we are than the institutions of civil society, no re-
form could be more radical than their reform, and no dispute could be
more political than the debate over their future.
IV. THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
This is the premise of Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato's monumen-
tal study, Civil Society and Political Theory. Where Fukuyama's argu-
ment stresses the discontinuities between West and East, Cohen and
Arato emphasize the continuities; and where Fukuyama sees the tri-
umph of reform in the East as a vindication of the status quo in the
76. See BINDER, supra note 68, at 18-22; MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZEN-
BACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 314-40 (1961); HERSH LAU-
TERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 158-74 (1947).
77. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957).
78. Perhaps Fukuyama is right that postideological and postindustrial powers will be less
covetous of third world hearts and mine. But if ex-superpowers will be less aggressive in the
"less-developed" world they will also be less interested. In the near future much of humanity
will experience not liberal utopia, but Malthusian apocalypse - famine, disease, civil war, anar-
chy - and the violence of the developed world will be no less violent for being passive.
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West, Cohen and Arato see reform in the East and the West as parallel
projects. Interest in civil society as a site of reform arose both in the
West and the East over the past quarter century for essentially the
same reason - the disappointment and defeat of efforts to achieve
reform through the state.
A. The Politics of Civil Society in the West
During the austerity of the 1970s and the privatization process of
the 1980s, a variety of factors encouraged European and American
leftists to trim their sails. Economic indictments of the welfare state
were widely disseminated and seemingly confirmed by the punishment
international financial markets inflicted on governments pursuing re-
distributive programs.79 A weakening of the trade union movement
further undermined political support for the welfare state. While still
hoping for capitalism's apocalyptic crisis in some far off "final analy-
sis," Marxist political economists increasingly conceded that state pol-
icy and national politics would remain hostage to international
markets for several centuries. 80 The collapse of communism provided
conclusive evidence that siding with the state against the market put
the left on the wrong side of history.
Finding virtue in necessity, theorists and activists began to ques-
tion the desirability as well as the practicability of using the state as an
instrument of working-class interests. On both sides of the Atlantic, a
broad range of academics converged on a critique of the welfare state
as the bureaucratic management of those it purported to empower and
serve. Activists in Germany complained that working-class-affiliated
parties were so corruptly implicated in the military-industrial complex
that they were incapable of pursuing the emerging peace and environ-
mental issues. The emerging movement of feminism challenged radi-
calism's traditional confinement of politics to the "public spheres" of
state and market.81
Deeper suspicions began to surface that the left's traditional dream
of a revolutionary utopia was dangerously sentimental and simplis-
tic.8 2 Revolution struck poststructuralists as implying the return of
power to an original popular sovereign unmediated by representative
institutions.83 They suspected that utopianism similarly expressed an
79. See, e.g., Fred Block, Social Policy and Accumulation: A Critique of the New Consensus,
in STAGNATMON AND RENEWAL 13 (Martin Rein et al. eds., 1987).
80. See Immanuel Walerstein, Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Pos.
sibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy, 17 AFR. STUD. REV. 1 (1974).
81. P. 12 (right wing critique of welfare state); pp. 42-47 (German "Greens" attack on party
system, as articulated by Claus Offe); pp. 532-48 (feminist critique of state/market dichotomy);
pp. 262-68 (Foucaultian attack on welfare state).
82. See Binder, supra note 36, at 2008-12.
83. Jacques Derrida, Force ofLaw: The "Mystical Foundation ofAuthority," 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
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unrealistic hope of returning humanity to some unalienated natural
state. Poststructuralists came to view all such efforts to resist heteron-
omy as totalitarian threats to heterogeneity.84 Others endorsed leftist
critiques of the market but felt torn between the competing utopias of
meaningful work, cultural community, and participatory politics. Un-
willing to embrace the individualism or value neutrality often associ-
ated with an ethic of consumption, they nevertheless began to see civil
society as a forum in which a plurality of goods could be pursued col-
lectively. A differentiated society, in which success is measured and
recognition conferred along a multiplicity of parameters, seems un-
likely to be a hierarchical society.85
To Western reformers, then, civil society has come to represent a
setting in which the New Left themes of community and participatory
democracy can be pursued at a safe distance from both the embarrass-
ment of Marxism and the demands of capitalism.
B. The Politics of Civil Society in the East
For Eastern reformers also, the turn to civil society began as a
prudential strategy. Recalling Soviet repression of both popular
revolution in Hungary and government-led reform in Czechoslovakia,
Eastern Europeans might well have despaired of achieving any mean-
ingful change. But Polish reformer Adam Michnik instead drew the
conclusion that reform might be sustainable so long as it left the state-
party apparatus intact. The goal of reform, Michnik concluded,
should be to create a vocal, organized, and politically informed public,
capable of criticizing, influencing, and legitimizing state policy. 86
Surprisingly, this strategy met with a measure of encouragement
from governing elites in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Like
the French Revolution, some of the Eastern European revolutions
seemed ascribable to the efforts of absolutist rulers to discipline their
recalcitrant subordinates by mobilizing public opinion.87 In the Soviet
and Hungarian cases, economic crises induced a new generation of
leaders to try market-oriented reforms. As these reforms met with
bureaucratic resistance, the new leaders sought popular support,
thereby encouraging the emergence of a civic public. 88 In the Polish
84. See, eg., Iris M. Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM 300 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
85. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY (1989); Michael
Walzer, A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society, 1991 DISSENT 293.
86. Pp. 31-32; ADAM MICHNIK, A New Evolutionism, in LETTERS FROM PRISON AND
OTHER ESSAYS 135 (Maya Latynski, trans., 1985).
87. For an interpretation of the French Revolution as the monarchy losing control of its own
modernization policy, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLU-
TION (1989).
88. Pp. 60-65. For an extensive discussion of the emergence of a civic public in the Soviet
Union, see GEOFFREY HOSKING, THE AWAKENING OF THE SOVIET UNION (1990), especially at
50-75, 126-56. For accounts of the Hungarian transition, see Barnabas Racz, Political Pluralisa-
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case, an unrepentant regime lost the ability to maintain economic or-
der. Here, too, the government came to see dissidents - already or-
ganized by Solidarity and by the Church - less as enemies than as
potential partners with whom to negotiate some alternative to anar-
chy. 9 Once mobilized, legitimated, and in time even legally protected,
the new civic publics could not be confined to commenting on eco-
nomic policy. Once the principle of popular consultation was thus en-
trenched, pressure for democratization became difficult to resist.
Had the Eastern European revolutions followed the course of the
French revolution, we might have expected a Jacobin moment in
which the revolutionary vanguard threw off the shackles of the old
regime and constituted themselves representatives of a sovereign.
Some have suggested that they will do so,90 and some have suggested
that they should. 91 But many Eastern European reformers have ex-
pressed a continuing commitment to the civil society strategy and a
self-conscious resistance to the Jacobin temptation. 92 Seeing totalitar-
ian dangers in the invocation of an extraconstitutional sovereign, they
have preferred to amend existing organic laws, deficient in popular
legitimacy though those laws may be.93 By eschewing the fiction that
institutions are brought into being by the unitary will of a constituent
power, reformers have expressed a commitment to the rule of law,
avoided self-apotheosis, and they have welcomed a plurality of polit-
ical voices into the reform process.
Perhaps dangerously, these voices have often included prior ruling
elites. Yet just as these elites were not strong enough to rule without
the legitimation of the dissidents, the former dissidents may not yet be
strong enough - may not wish to be strong enough - to rule without
the supporters of the old regime. By inviting the communists in, the
reformers avoid provoking counterrevolution, share responsibility for
unpopular austerity programs, and broaden the still narrow civic
tion in Hungary. The 1990 Elections, 43 SOVIET STUD. 107 (1991); Anna Seleny, Hidden Enter-
prise and Property Rights Reform in Socialist Hungary, 13 LAW & POLY. 149 (1991); Rudolf L.
Tks, Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989-90, PROBS. OF COMMU-
NISM, Nov. - Dec. 1990, at 44; Ivan Volgyes, Leadership Drift in Hungary. Empirical Observa-
tions on a Normative Concept, 22 STUD. COMP. COMMUNISM 23 (1989).
89. Pp. 65-66. For fuller accounts of the role of civil associations in the Polish transforma-
tion, see LAWRENCE GOODWYN, BREAKING THE BARRIER: THE RISE OF SOLIDARITY IN PO-
LAND 255-311 (1991); MICHAEL D. KENNEDY, PROFESSIONALS, POWER AND SOLIDARITY IN
POLAND 161-95 (1991); Robert Zuzowski, The Origins of Open Organized Dissent in Today's
Poland: KOR and Other Dissident Groups, 25 E. EUR. Q. 59 (1991).
90. Wiktor Osiatyfiski, The Constitution-Making Process in Poland, 13 LAW & PoLY. 125,
132 (1991).
91. ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 46-68.
92. This preference for a differentiated and institutionalized sovereign over a unitary popular
sovereign is a strong theme in Hegel's political theory. See TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 405-06,
412-13, 434.
93. Ulrich K. Preuss, The Politics of Constitution Making: Transforming Politics into Consti-




Motivating the reformers' self-limiting gestures is the goal of insu-
lating civil society from the state. What is not yet clear is the extent to
which civil society will be identified with emergent markets. In Po-
land, the mobilization of civil society preceded privatization, and there
is some evidence that the privatization process is being planned to pre-
serve or foster workplace association by giving or selling enterprises to
their workers.95 In Hungary, on the other hand, considerable priva-
tization had already occurred under communism, and some believe
this precipitated the emergence of a reform constituency. 96 While
markets were part of the program upon which all the reform move-
ments rode to power,97 Eastern Europeans cynically expect privatiza-
tion to benefit primarily former party members with more connections
and hard currency.98 Echoing Hegel, some observers are also con-
cerned about the threat unregulated markets may pose to the solidar-
ity of the very associations that enabled reform in the first place.99
Cohen and Arato warn that
[democratic] actors will not be able to accept liberal economic policy as
anything but transitional, since a fully automatic market would become
destructive for the social fabric, for social solidarity. Karl Pol~nyi's les-
son should not be forgotten, particularly in his native country, and in-
deed the actors of civil society will certainly relearn it. [p. 489]
Surprisingly, this dual anxiety of Eastern European reformers to
insulate civil society from both state and market converges with the
recent thought of reformers in the West.
V. A CULTURAL THEORY OF POLITICS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL THEORY
Drawing together the Eastern and Western variants of the civil
society argument, Cohen and Arato urge the advantages of civil soci-
ety's differentiation from state and market. Principally, they urge that
civil society is a more auspicious site for further democratizing con-
temporary society than either state or market (p. 417).
No review can fairly summarize this epic, eclectic, almost encyclo-
pedic 1°° volume, which introduces the reader to the conceptions and
94. Bruce Ackerman offers a similar argument against draconian punishment of prior ruling
elites. ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 69-98.
95. Andrzej A. Czynczyk, Privatization in Poland: Politics, Society, and the Law, 13 LAW &
POLY. 171, 172-76 (1991).
96. Seleny, supra note 88.
97. See Preuss, supra note 93, at 111.
98. Czynczyk, supra note 95, at 176; Voytek Zubek, The Polish Communist Elite and the
Petty Entrepreneurs, 25 E. EUR. Q. 339, 355 (1991).
99. See TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 405.
100. A more completely encyclopedic volume would have given us a fuller introduction to
such predecessors of Hegel as Bodin, Locke, Montesquieu, Hutcheson, and Herder; would have
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critiques of civil society developed by - to mention only the starring
roles - Michnik, 10 1 Hegel, 10 2 Parsons, 10 3 Gramsci, 1° 4 Arendt, 05
Schmitt,106 Habermas, 107 Foucault, 108 Luhmann, 109 Teubner, 110
Offe, 111 Touraine, 112 Tilly,11 3 and Fraser. 114 For our purposes, how-
ever, Cohen and Arato's argument is most usefully understood as a
challenge to four conventional oppositions in contemporary political
debate.
First, by stressing the potential autonomy of civil society, Cohen
and Arato challenge the conventional division of society into state and
market (pp. 11-18); the authors take particular pains to distinguish
civil society from each. Thus they criticize classical democracy's iden-
tification of community and polity for politicizing all social life, in-
cluding questions of culture (pp. 197-200); and they express the
concern that Hegel would not sufficiently insulate civil society from
given more attention to Hegel's great contemporary De Tocqueville; and would not have ne-
glected Hegel's most important successor, Otto Gierke.
101. MICHNIK, supra note 86.
102. HEGEL, supra note 47.
103. TALcorr PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES (1971).
104. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Joseph A. Buttigieg ed. & Joseph A. But-
tigieg & Antonio Callari trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1992) (1975).
105. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958); HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION (1963); HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951).
106. CARL SCHMIr, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., Rutgers
Univ. Press 1976) (1932); CARL SCHMITr, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen
Kennedy trans., M.I.T. Press 1985) (1923).
107. JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (1979);
JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975); JORGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO
A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989);
JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1973); JORGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
108. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
109. JORGEN HABERMAS & NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAFT ODER SOZI-
ALTECHNOLOGIE: WAS LEISTET DIE SYSTEMFORSCHUNG? (1971); NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen Holmes & Charles Larmore trans., 1982); NIKLAS
LUHMANN, POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WELFARE STATE (1990); NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SocIO-
LOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed. & Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans.,
Routledge & Kegan Pub]. 1985) (1972).
110. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW &
SocY. REV. 239 (1983).
111. CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE (John Keane ed., 1984);
CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM (John Keane ed., 1985).
112. ALAIN TOURAINE, THE MAY MOVEMENT (Leonard F.X. Mayhew trans., Random
House 1971) (1968); ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE (Alan Duff trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1981) (1978); Alain Touraine, An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements, 52
Soc. REs. 749 (1985); Alain Touraine, Triumph or Downfall of Civil Society, in 1 HUMANITIES
IN REVIEW 218 (Ronald Dworkin et al. eds., 1982).
113. CHARLES TILLY ET AL., THE REBELLIOUS CENTURY: 1830-1930 (1975).
114. Nancy Fraser, What's Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gen-
der, NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, Spring/Summer 1985, at 97 (1985).
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the influence of the state (pp. 233, 248, 249, 411). On the other hand,
they object to the Scottish school's identification of sociability with
commerce (pp. 89-90) and reject Marx' reduction of civil association
to bourgeois bargaining (p. 411).
For Cohen and Arato, the state and the market are distinct subsys-
tems within society (p. 428), best understood as tools or steering mech-
anisms that aggregate and implement voter and consumer preferences
(pp. 471-72). Perhaps alienating, these steering mechanisms are never-
theless useful and inevitable features of modem society (p. 415). Only
in civil society does the modem citizen-consumer receive her ration of
recognition (pp. 376, 417, 472, 480). While the state is the arena of
politics and the market of economics, Cohen and Arato see civil soci-
ety as the seat of culture. They further divide culture into three as-
pects: (1) civil society's institutional structure, by which they mean
the associations that make up civil society (pp. 428-29), (2) the group
identities conferred and recognized within civil society (pp. 376-78,
558-60), and (3) the codes of normative discourse - the shared pur-
poses, perspectives, traditions, and vocabularies - that hold groups
together (pp. 435-36, 526). To say that the subsystem of civil society is
the seat of culture is to say that it functions within the larger social
system to produce the preferences aggregated by the subsystems of
state and market.
Second, following Michnik, Cohen and Arato blur the neat distinc-
tion between reform and revolution (p. 493). The differentiation of so-
ciety into several relatively autonomous subsystems implies that
change can take place in one without dramatically altering another.
Indeed, Cohen and Arato suggest that the successful reform of one
subsystem may depend on the stable support of the others. At the
very least, reform stands a better chance if it does not simultaneously
threaten interests entrenched in all three. Because the goal of total
revolution attacks society as an integrated totality, however, it is
pragmatically unrealistic and normatively undesirable.
Third, by stressing civil society's artificiality, Cohen and Arato
challenge the conventional opposition between liberalism and commu-
nitarianism (pp. 8-10). Here, they have four related points to make.
First, following Hegel,1 15 they distinguish the associations of civil
society from the traditional ascriptive communities threatened by
modernization (pp. 500-03, 524). Many of the institutions of civil so-
ciety - professional societies, charitable organizations, trade unions
- are distinctively modem and wholly voluntary. In addition, many
of the characteristic activities of these organizations - meeting,
marching, striking, publishing, lobbying, suing - are made possible
by characteristically modem legal protections.
115. P. 106; TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 435.
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Thus, a second point is that the collective action of civil associa-
tions depends upon the civil liberties of individuals (pp. 400-03, 562).
Third, if modem community depends upon liberal rights, liberal
individualism also depends upon community. Following Hegel, Co-
hen and Arato reason that individual identity is conferred by social
recognition in the context of community (pp. 377-78). What makes
modem society freer than a traditional ascriptive community is not the
absence of community, but the availability of multiple communities
offering a given individual multiple identities (pp. 433-36).
Fourth, solidarity depends upon and fosters not only the liberta-
rian, but also the democratic aspect of liberalism. Solidarity depends
upon democracy because civil society is an artificial construct, not a
given. The formation and sustenance of civil associations depend
upon a myriad of social and political choices.1 16 Hence, we cannot
secure solidarity without democratic control over the conditions of
civil association. At the same time democracy depends upon solidar-
ity because, as Michael Walzer puts it,
[n]o state can survive for long if it is wholly alienated from civil society.
It cannot outlast its own coercive machinery; it is lost, literally, without
its firepower. The production and reproduction of loyalty, civility, polit-
ical competence, and trust in authority are never the work of the state
alone, and the effort to go it alone - one meaning of totalitarianism - is
doomed to failure. 117
A fourth currently conventional opposition Cohen and Arato chal-
lenge is the distinction between representative and participatory democ-
racy (pp. 4-8). Partisans often defend representative democracy as a
device for consulting and accommodating all interest groups powerful
enough to disrupt the social order. Participatory democracy, by con-
trast, is usually defended as a path to self-realization, deliberative ra-
tionality, and group solidarity. But because group interests are
formulated in civil society, reason Cohen and Arato, participatory and
representative democracy can coexist. Civil society is the context for
participation with its attendant educational benefits (pp. 417, 599).
The political subsystem is the context for representation, the steering
116. As Michael Walzer points out:
Families with working parents need state help in the form of publicly funded day care and
effective public schools. National minorities need help in organizing and sustaining their
own educational programs. Worker-owned companies and consumer cooperatives need
state loans or loan guarantees; so do (even more often) capitalist entrepreneurs and firms.
Philanthropy and mutual aid, churches and private universities, depend upon tax exemp-
tions. Labor unions need legal recognition and guarantees against "unfair labor practices."
Professional associations need state support for their licensing procedures. And across the
entire range of association, individual men and women need to be protected against the
power of officials, employers, experts, party bosses, factory foremen, directors, priests, par-
ents, patrons; and small and weak groups need to be protected against large and powerful
ones. For civil society, left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships, which
only state power can challenge.
WALZER, supra note 85, at 302.
117. Id. at 301.
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of policy by interests. Absent broad participation in the formulation
of group interests, their pursuit in the crass arena of interest-group
politics cannot be democratically legitimate (p. 418). At the same
time, if democratically formulated interests are not zealously repre-
sented, fairly aggregated, and efficiently implemented, democracy will
also be thwarted (pp. 414-15). Hence, representative and par-
ticipatory democracy are not just compatible, but mutually dependent
norms governing the distinct arenas of state and civil society.
Although this collaboration between representation and participa-
tion depends partly on the separation between state and civil society, it
also links these arenas together. For Cohen and Arato do not simply
accept the conventional dichotomy between deliberative participation
and adversarial representation. Instead, they regard deliberative ra-
tionality as a criterion of legitimacy for all democratic processes, rep-
resentative as well as participatory. Representative democracy must
not only aggregate but also integrate diverse interests by commen-
surating them to broadly shared principles and purposes (pp. 413,
589). Cohen and Arato suggest that this purpose is best accomplished
when the political process is permeated by deliberative bodies in which
the associations of civil society are represented (pp. 482, 544, 547).
While they are frustratingly vague on how to institutionalize these cul-
tural receptors, we might imagine a proliferation of citizen commis-
sions conducting public hearings and reporting on policy issues. Such
a device would enable citizen participation while informing represen-
tative deliberation.
In this complex vision of democracy, representative democracy de-
pends upon a participatory civil society not only for the preferences it
aggregates, but for the civic culture - the mutually intelligible gram-
mar of argument, empathy, deference, and reconciliation - that en-
ables deliberation (pp. 413, 589). Yet, the achievement of this
important contribution to democratic representation constrains civil
society. Associations and groups must define themselves as part of a
tolerant, pluralist society and must articulate their values in terms in-
telligible to others if they are to sustain, rather than simply take ad-
vantage of, democracy (p. 602).
In sum, seeing liberal representative democracy as necessary but
insufficient, Cohen and Arato would subject it to the influence of a
relatively autonomous, solidaristic, and participatory civil society.
How can this be accomplished? Cohen and Arato identify two
types of reform strategies compatible with their program: social
movements that attempt to change power relations by changing cul-
ture, and policy reforms that redistribute resources by empowering as-
sociations rather than simply transferring wealth.
Sociologists have traditionally explained collective protest either as
a mass hysterical reaction to social change (p. 495) or as the exploita-
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tion by long-standing interest groups of emergent conflicts among
elites (pp. 496-503). Yet these theories have had difficulty accounting
for the new social movements of the last three decades - the Ameri-
can civil rights movement; pacifist, feminist, and environmentalist
movements throughout the West; liberation theology in Latin
America; and prodemocracy movements in Latin America, and South-
ern and Eastern Europe. The arresting aspect of these movements is
that they brought together and mobilized large numbers of previously
unconnected people through rational discourse. Cohen and Arato see
these movements as examples of discursive action's potential to change
policy by changing the interests and self-conceptions of political actors
(pp. 503-20, 530).
The authors use the American feminist movement as an example
of such a cultural path to political change (p. 548). In deliberately
politicizing such "private sphere" issues as contraception, abortion,
rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, childcare, and women's
health (pp. 551, 554-55), the practice of consciousness raising affects
all the aspects of culture analyzed above. First and most obviously, by
developing and disseminating new codes of normative discourse, con-
sciousness raising influences political views. Second, by naming unar-
ticulated grievances, such movements confer new identities. Third,
political meetings, consciousness-raising groups, and the like provide
solidarity by embodying those identities in new associative structures.
Fourth, to the extent raised consciousness alters patterns of associa-
tion in the "private sphere," it further impacts culture (pp. 526, 550-
54).
These cultural changes alter policymaking not only by changing
the language of public debate, but also by including new participants,
who become receptors of civil society in the political process. At this
point winning legal protections against violence and discrimination or
for reproductive autonomy becomes possible. Such protections, in
turn, further entrench the movement in civil society by fostering new
institutions such as abortion clinics, battered women's shelters, rape
crisis centers, and daycare centers, and by continuing to restructure
the most influential association in civil society, the family.
Social movements win representation in policymaking by mobiliz-
ing participation in the realm of civil society, yet policymakers can
affect the conditions of civil societal mobilization for better or worse.
Cohen and Arato identify the controversial area of social welfare pol-
icy as one in which differing approaches can make civil society more
or less participatory. Unwilling simply to endorse the repudiation of
the welfare state that has recently emerged across the political spec-
trum, Cohen and Arato distinguish between welfare state reforms that
empower and those that weaken civil society:
Surely legal reforms that secure the freedom of wage workers to organize
unions and bargain collectively, that protect them from being fired for
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such collective action, and that secure worker representation on com-
pany boards differ in kind from means-tested grants to single parent
households and from social services that "instruct" clients on how to
function properly as childrearers and responsible providers according to
some preconceived model. The difference between these types of reforms
is not fully captured by reference to the genders (or, for that matter, to
the race) of the people they target.... The former set of reforms, unlike
the latter, do not create isolated clients of a state bureaucracy but rather
empower individuals to act together collectively, to develop new solidari-
ties, and to achieve a greater balance of power relations because they are
addressed to an area that is already formally organized. Such reforms
create "receptors" in the economic subsystem for the influence of the
norms and modes of action of civil society by putting procedures for
discursive conflict resolution into place, thereby asserting control of the
latter over the former without dedifferentiating them. The second type
of reform does the reverse: It brings the full force of administrative
agencies into areas that are not and should not be formally organized.
This threatens the communicative infrastructure and autonomy of civil
society and undermines the capacities of "beneficiaries" to act for them-
selves or to settle conflicts discursively. [p. 547; footnotes omitted]
In preferring guarantees of job security, solidarity, and participation to
mere transfer payments, Cohen and Arato replicate Hegel's point that
social stability and political legitimacy depend upon a broad distribu-
tion not of wealth, but of recognition.
Yet this Hegelian analysis of the social welfare problem reveals the
greatest difficulty facing Cohen and Arato's cultural theory of politics.
For Hegel, you may recall, the social welfare problem was modem
society's Achilles' heel: no matter how much wealth markets gener-
ate, they can not by themselves generate universal recognition unless
they can put everyone to productive, challenging, educative work. But
the market's logic of competitive automation sets productivity and la-
bor intensity at odds. Although an advanced, postindustrial economy
can easily afford welfare transfers to the marginally least productive
laborers, this does not give them the recognition they desire. Produc-
tively employing them, however, leads to overproduction - which not
only defeats the purpose, but also disrupts the market's efficient alloca-
tion of resources. Hence, Hegel's deeply pessimistic claim is that rec-
ognition and efficient allocation are ultimately incompatible - that
culture and commerce are intractably opposed subsystems.
What is the relationship between culture and commerce in Cohen
and Arato's theory? While providing an elaborate and plausible vision
of a participatory culture's democratizing influence on the political
subsystem, they are frustratingly evasive on the desirability of simi-
larly democratizing the economic subsystem. Cohen and Arato worry
that if workplace participation means perpetual meetings, it will im-
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pair efficiency. 118 On the other hand, they endorse the representation
of workers in corporate decisionmaking (pp. 416-17, 479) without ever
explaining how workers are to develop the deliberative, participatory
culture that would qualify such representation as democratic. If
worker representation is nothing more than bargaining over economic
interests ascribed to workers, it is simply another form of commerce,
unaffected by culture. At one point Cohen and Arato suggest the con-
flicting claims of culture and commerce may be left to democratic res-
olution in the political subsystem (p. 399). But if the representative
democracy of the political subsystem depends upon a deliberative, par-
ticipatory culture, and if the commercialization of association threat-
ens that culture, the political subsystem may lose its democratic
character.
At the core of Cohen and Arato's confusion concerning the rela-
tionship between culture and commerce is their equivocation on the
importance of self-realization through meaningful work. For Hegel,
work was a crucial arena for personal development and social recogni-
tion. He envisioned the organization of workers into societies admit-
ting members on the basis of proficiency and inculcating skills, ethics,
and pride.
The closest analogues to Hegel's guildlike corporations in our pos-
tindustrial service economy are the professions, and there is considera-
ble appeal to the idea of professionalizing all service. Bill Simon has
suggested that professionalization not only enhances the dignity and
interest of service work, but also the recognition and participation af-
forded service consumers or clients. 119 It also gives both parties a
common interest and language, which may be the basis for political
mobilization.
But can these cultural benefits be achieved without reducing allo-
cative efficiency? Can a postindustrial service economy universalize
recognition without provoking the crises of overproduction that Hegel
foresaw for industrial economies? I suspect not. Health care provides
the most spectacular example of the spiraling cost of professional serv-
ices. How much of this cost is ascribable to the Kantian ethic of valu-
ing each patient as an end in herself? The upside of this ethic is its
recognition of the patient's uniqueness, and the challenge it affords
doctors to test the utmost limits of their skill and compassion. The
downside includes the expenditure of resources on high technology
and deathbed heroics that would be better spent on preventive public
health measures.
Following Hegel, we may think of extraordinary care as a form of
118. Pp. 20, 416, 453-54, 476 (describing conflicts between economic rationality and
solidarity).




overproduction in the service economy. Psychotherapy, litigation, and
education may be services that are similarly overproduced in our soci-
ety, in self-defeating efforts to close a collective deficit of recognition.
The fewer people we can employ making things, the more people we
must employ producing human capital; but the more human capital
we produce, the more human capital we must productively employ.
Hegel's vicious cycle of overproduction and underrecognition seems to
survive the passing of industrial society. Even if, as Fukuyama argues,
the passing of industrial society has ended state-socialism's challenge
to the market, the fundamental, generative conflict of culture and
commerce endures.
Unlike Fukuyama, Cohen and Arato recognize the composition of
culture as a difficult political issue. But, like Fukuyama, they simply
assume the peaceful coexistence of culture and commerce and thereby
disguise the issue's real difficulty.
VI. THE CURTAIN REMAINS OPEN, THE STAGE LIT
The cold war fortified the boundary between state and market, en-
shrouding in iron the cultures constructing each. The parting of that
iron curtain reveals the rich array of political choices facing us in the
fashioning of culture. In politicizing culture, the end of the cold war
broadens political debate from the single dimension of how much the
state should regulate commerce to the polydimensional questions of
what kind of state and what kind of market we aspire to have.
Fukuyama remains blind to the political complexity revealed by
the iron curtain's withdrawal. Recognizing only the cold war's single
dimension of struggle, Fukuyama sees its end as the iron curtain's re-
treat rather than its breach. Hence, he remains blind to the contin-
gency revealed behind the curtain. What marks Fukuyama as a
neoconservative is first, that his liberalism is rooted in an invariant
conception of human nature, and second, that it is confined to the
political and economic spheres. In the sphere of culture, he is con-
servative. For Fukuyama, culture is an unalterable given, a residue of
traditional authority surviving the modernization of political and eco-
nomic life. It is crucially important, determining rates of productivity
and violent crime; but it is beyond political debate, impervious to de-
liberate and deliberative choice, and outside history. Notwithstanding
his appropriation of Hegel, Fukuyama is profoundly antihistoricist. If
he now believes history is over, that is because he assumes nothing
important could ever be decided by history anyway.
If neoconservatives are cultural conservatives only, Cohen and
Arato are neoradicals, confining their radicalism to the cultural
sphere. Calling for radical cultural transformation, they see culture as
a domain of political struggle and historical contingency. In this
sense, they are genuine historicists. The difficulty is that, because cul-
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ture constructs political and economic interests, the politics of culture
cannot be so neatly confined to the cultural sphere. Cohen and Arato
confront and illuminate the complex linkages between the cultural do-
main of civil society and the political domain of the state. Here they
seem gratified to point out that the cultural construction of politics
permits its further democratization. But they leave the linkages be-
tween civil society and market in the shadows and evade the question
of how much economic change a more democratic culture would
require.
We may understand post-totalitarian politics in two ways. We
may conclude that the curtain has come down on history and the im-
portant political disputes have all been resolved in favor of liberalism.
Or, recalling that liberalism garnered much of its meaning and appeal
from its confrontation with totalitarianism, we may suspect that liber-
alism's triumph has drained it of content and consequence. Reminded
of history's contingency by the cold war's ddnouement, we may specu-
late that post-totalitarian politics will prove equally unpredictable.
Though our conflicts may now be confined to the realm of culture,
culture is no refuge from history. It is where history gets made.
The curtain remains open, the footlights beckon, and nothing pre-
vents our stepping onto the stage.
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ADMINISTERING JUSTICE IN A CONSENSUS-
BASED SOCIETY
Koichiro Fujikura*
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARA-
DOX. By John 0. Haley. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991.
Pp. x, 258. $39.95.
In Authority Without Power,1 Professor John Haley2 attempts to
explain significant Japanese paradoxes:
Japan is notable as a society with both extraordinary institutional con-
tinuity along with institutional change; of cohesion with conflict, hierar-
chy with equality, cooperation with competition, and above all else a
manifest prevalence of community control with an equally strong im-
pulse toward independence and autonomy .... It is a nation where polit-
ical rule appears strong but also weak; governance centralized but also
diffused; the individual subservient but also achieving; the social order
closed but also open. [p. 4]
Professor Haley develops a thesis that Japan's society and its legal
system is one of "authority without power" and "law without sanc-
tions." His pairing of these words, usually understood as almost sy-
nonymous in the Western legal and political lexicon, serves as the key
for his analysis of the Japanese legal system. The author has suc-
ceeded in constructing a theoretical package to explain those para-
doxes of Japanese law and society often puzzling to Western observers,
and in doing so he presents a plausible overall picture of the Japanese
legal system. To provide a general account and analysis of any legal
system is a formidable intellectual undertaking, but Haley's picture of
Japan's legal system should be quite persuasive to Western readers,
and it is certainly fascinating to Japanese readers.
Professor Haley argues that, by the mid-nineteenth century, Japa-
nese society had well-established institutions and processes for three
basic paradigms of societal control: "[first] the administrative
* Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo. Bach. of Law 1957, Doshisha University
(Japan); B.A. 1961, Amherst College; LL.M. 1962, Northwestern; LL.M. 1963, Harvard. - Ed.
1. This review reflects views expressed by participants in a minisymposium on Professor
Haley's book held on December 16, 1992, at the University of Tokyo. I am especially indebted to
comments made by members of a Western panel: Professor Richard Minear of the University of
Massachusetts, Professor Mark Ramseyer of the University of Chicago Law School, and Profes-
sor Malcolm Smith of the University of Melbourne Law School.




processes of a centralized bureaucratic state, [second] the adjudicatory
institutions for a system of judicial governance, and [third] arrange-
ments of indirect governance based predominantly on community-
based consensual or contractual patterns of social control exemplified
by the rural mura or village" (p. 18).
Some legal historians are certain to dispute the relevance of
Haley's paradigms and interpretations. Nevertheless, many Japanese
legal scholars may find his bold attempt revealing, for they generally
perceive Japan's contemporary law and legal institutions as the prod-
uct of a wholesale adoption of Western legal systems since the Meiji
Restoration, a time when Japan apparently made a clean break from
its own legal traditions and institutions.3 Haley's paradigms may also
be revealing for those who still labor under the popular assumption in
the United States that no such thing as "law" exists in Japan.
Haley depicts three paradigms that effectively challenge these ele-
mentary assumptions about Japanese law and society. His contribu-
tion and the book's strength can be found in the first part, in which he
provides, using bold strokes and drawing from existing works, a con-
cise description of Japanese legal history from the seventh century on
and develops his dynamic for understanding Japanese law and soci-
ety.4 He is less successful, however, in applying this dynamic to his
carefully chosen contemporary subject areas in the book's second
part.5 His paradigms, apparently serving their intended purposes,
often prove troublesome and unsatisfactory in analyzing the role of
law in contemporary Japanese society. In concrete cases, Haley's par-
adigms seem to prove too much or too little and seem to invoke more
than dispel untested assumptions.
Before discussing the three interrelated paradigms and the
3. What is the real importance of the old Japanese law to the modem law of Japan? As
will be seen, the modem state law has no connection with the former Japanese law. The
modem law considers itself rather as an heir of Western law.... It could therefore be said
that the history of Japanese law is, for the present at least, a luxury.
YosiYuKi NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 39 (Anthony N. Angelo trans. & ed.,
1976).
4. Other recent and concise works in English on Japanese legal history include: RYOsUKE
ISHII, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN (1980); CARL STEENSTRUP, A HIs-
TORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 (1991).
5. The book consists of two parts. Part I is captioned "Continuity with Change: The Histor-
ical Foundations of Governance and Legal Control in Japan" (p. 17) and includes historical
accounts and an analysis of the development of the Japanese legal system from the seventh cen-
tury A.D., when Japan began selectively adopting aspects of China's legal system, to the Meiji
Restoration of 1868, when Japan, in an apparent abandonment of its traditional system, began
adopting features of the civil law systems of continental Europe, drawing primarily from German
and French codes.
Part II is entitled "Cohesion with Conflict: The Containment of Legal Controls" (p. 81) and
deals with four carefully selected aspects of the contemporary Japanese legal system: "Lawsuits
and Lawyers: The Making of a Myth" (ch. 5); "Policemen and Prosecutors: Crime without
Punishment" (ch. 6); "Bureaucrats and Business: Administrative Power Constrained" (ch. 7);
and "Hamlets and Hoodlums: The Social Impact of Law without Sanctions" (ch. 8).
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problems they pose in their application, one must first examine some
critical principles that the reader must apply to assess a book of this
nature - a book in which the author, from a comparative perspective,
tries to construct a general theory for understanding a foreign legal
culture within the context of the society's history, culture, and
ideology.
First, any effort to build an overarching, general theoretical frame-
work to explain another society and its law, especially Japan, though
inspiring and stimulating, is suspect and bound to produce distortions
and myths. In developing paradigms in the historical context, one
must always ask critical questions such as what the connection is be-
tween history and contemporary Japan and how direct an influence
one can see, for example, between a pre-World War I Japanese village
and a modem Japanese village. Without establishing a reasonable
connection between historical facts and contemporary problems, any
general theory tends to produce loose and slippery interpretations.
Second, one faces an evident risk in relying on excessive contrasts
and overstatements in any two-sided comparison, especially between
Japan and the United States. Any finding of inscrutable nature in one
society may reflect extremity in the other. Haley, aware of this risk,
tries to broaden his comparisons by referring to Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Korea as much as possible.6 Despite the author's ca-
veat,7 however, the book overemphasizes distinctions and peculiarities,
rather than similarities and common elements, of Japanese law and
legal institutions that reflect opposite characteristics from those found
in American law and legal institutions.
Third, the author often relies heavily upon cultural explanations.
Granted that "legal systems are themselves self-defining, cultural be-
lief systems" (p. 4) and cultural explanations are useful in developing a
general understanding of the Japanese legal system, cultural explana-
tions are difficult to substantiate or disprove. Analyzing cultural dif-
ferences in terms of rational human behavior and the various
institutional constraints affecting individual decisionmaking may
prove more productive.
6. The author's intention is indeed ambitious and goes beyond a simple two-sided
comparison.
As a study of a legal order in a specific context, this book is intended to expand understand-
ing of the function and limits of law in society. Japan's legal order thus becomes the focus
for a broader exploration of the interrelationships of law, social order, and change.... The
purpose of this book therefore is twofold: to use Japan as a window to law and law as a
window to Japan.
P. 4.
7. At the outset, however, it is important for the reader to appreciate the stark contrast
with the United States and to guard against a common fallacy of viewing Japan from a
totally American perspective. Differences do exist but the United States has no greater
claim as model or standard for comparison than Japan. Both societies represent extremes of
a kind. Neither reflects the norm, if indeed any norm does exist.
P. 14. One might ask: "If no norm exists, how could there be paradox?"
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According to Haley, the historical development of Japan's legal
system can be divided into two broadly defined periods. "Each fea-
tures an abrupt infusion of foreign ideas and institutions followed by a
gradual process of indigenous adaptation" (p. 17). The first period,
during which Japan developed what the author calls an "ambivalent
tradition" (p. 17), is "characterized by the tensions between the ideas
and institutions derived from early imperial Chinese law and those
forged by native Japanese political and social forces" (p. 17). The sec-
ond period is characterized as a period of "[r]eception, adaptation, and
containment of Western law" (p. 18), starting with the French and the
German codes and legal institutions soon after the Meiji Restoration
in 1868. During this second period, "Japan experienced the institu-
tional transformation of its legal order into a modern, predominately
German-derivative, civil law system as well as the adaptation and ulti-
mate containment of Western legal institutions during the first half of
this century . . ." (p. 18). The author maintains that "[t]he process
continued in postwar Japan, commencing with military occupation
and the imposition of American-inspired constitutional and regulatory
reforms" (p. 18).
Haley develops his three paradigms against the backdrop of these
two broadly defined periods. The first paradigm is that of the adminis-
trative state with pervasive authority but with little coercive power, in
which law was public, serving as an instrument of the state, and de-
void of moral authority (pp. 19-32). Japan adopted this administrative
state tradition from China in its first reception of foreign law during
the seventh century. Japan borrowed both the concept of the state as a
political unit, with authority to rule vested in an imperial institution,
and methods of centralized bureaucratic governance. The imperial
rulers wielded enormous authority, but this authority did not carry a
consummate degree of state power; state authority tended to be much
broader than state coercive power. Also, in the Chinese tradition, law
and morality were essentially separated; laws were not, in and of them-
selves, moral commands. Private law, in the Western sense, was not
developed.
Borrowing selectively from this Chinese system, Japan instituted
land tenure, taxation, penal codes, and other administrative regula-
tions and procedures. Moreover, Japan began to develop indigenous
legal institutions. Beginning with the Kamakura bakufu (literally
"tent government") in the thirteenth century and lasting throughout
the Tokugawa bakufu in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ja-
pan established an effective and efficient administrative state with well-
developed institutional structures and a sophisticated bureaucratic
government.
The second paradigm is that of the adjudicatory state, or judicial
governance, which began with institutions developed to resolve dis-
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putes, particularly among warrior-vassals, and developed into a means
by which the Kamakura bakufu and later Shogunates ruled (pp. 33-
49). During the feudal period, the "idea of the supremacy of law as
command had begun to take hold," and "[a]dherence to codified pre-
scriptions and procedures of the past and basic elements of procedural
fairness had become integral to legitimate rule" (p. 49). Codified pro-
cedural rules distinguished between adjudication initiated by petition
and persecutions brought by authorities. Thus, civil actions as op-
posed to criminal actions were recognized for the first time.
With the development of an adjudicatory mechanism, Japanese
law and legal institutions began to take on a Western look. Japan's
experience resembled that of other Western European nations where
adjudicatory institutions developed after the collapse of a centralized
political power - in the Western context, the Roman Empire, in the
case of Japan, imperial rule from Kyoto. In Europe, these institutions
developed within the Roman law tradition, in which legal systems rec-
ognized private civil law. In Japan, well-established adjudicatory in-
stitutions with progressive case law and developed procedures grew in
the field of private law, resembling the growth of common law in Eng-
land. However, the government generally discouraged ordinary citi-
zens from using law to resolve disputes, and private disputes were
largely left to be resolved by members of the village communities.
The third paradigm is that of the mura: a quasi-independent and
quasi-autonomous village (pp. 51-65). The mura, a product of the late
sixteenth century, was an exclusive community of peasants. It func-
tioned as a self-contained economic and administrative unit. Village
officers were named and became responsible for managing their vil-
lages, and the headman was accountable to the ruling authorities for
any misdeed by village members. Villagers were subject to registra-
tion, tax, public work-labor obligations, and other regulatory controls
designed to maximize revenue yields and restrict social and geographic
mobility. In reality, however, villages retained a remarkable degree of
autonomy in the face of pervasive regulations and controls by the cen-
tral authorities.
So long as peace prevailed and taxes were paid, there was little to draw
official attention and scrutiny.... By suppressing intra-community quar-
rels and satisfying formal fiscal obligations, a village community could
restrain or avoid unwanted official regulation. The consequence was an
institutional structure that in allowing evasion of official legal controls
also promoted external deference and internal cohesion. In effect the
village had the security of the administrative state along with the free-
dom of the outlaw. [p. 61]
The desire and need to maintain mechanisms of self-governance
for social control is substantial when the goal is to maintain indepen-
dence from a central authority that exercises coercive power. The vil-
lage community developed its own mechanisms of control, including
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the psychological sanction of collective displeasure, ostracism, and ex-
pulsion. Community sanctions became real deterrents to wrongdoing
in Tokugawa Japan. This community control over sanctions "also
meant that the community had a significant degree of control over the
viability of legal norms.... Only the rules and standards the commu-
nity was willing to enforce by the threat or application of sanctions
could be effectively implemented within its confines" (p. 62).
By the mid-nineteenth century, the mura paradigm was firmly es-
tablished with its effective mechanisms of informal control to maintain
order within the village and to guard against the intrusion of the for-
mal legal sanctions exercised by the administrative state and judicial
institutions.
At this point, Japan experienced its second reception of foreign law
- European law. The consequence of the Meiji legal reform is of spe-
cial importance because the Napoleonic code and the German civil
code introduced into Japan were primarily concerned with private law
and were essentially products of liberal states in nineteenth-century
Europe. The adaptation of the civil code created a number of reper-
cussions. First, the civil code introduced a system of rules, based on a
very different concept of law, into Japan. The scope of law under the
civil code was significantly broader than the Japanese were accus-
tomed to under the traditional law exercised by the administrative
state, judicial institutions, and in the informal mura. Japan began im-
posing legal rules that regulated behaviors previously left untouched,
or at least ignored. For example, landlord-tenant relations, never
outside the scope of law, were regulated much more comprehensively
under the civil code. In addition, the Meiji legal reform introduced
law and institutions in which no dichotomy between authority and
power existed.
Japan then began the process of absorption and adaptation, a pro-
cess that produced some intended as well as unintended consequences.
In general, however, the reform conflicted with traditional modes of
social ordering. Coercive power gradually separated from the state,
while the state retained its authority. The reach of civil law and legal
institutions was contained by limiting ordinary citizens' use of courts
and by utilizing traditional methods of dispute-resolution. Conse-
quently, Japan developed into a state that, by all ostensible criteria,
has as broad an authority as any modern industrial state; conversely,
in terms of its coercive power and the use of its authority, Japan is
relatively weaker than most industrial states. Thus, a vacuum has
been created where state authority extends but no coercive power
reaches. The vacuum has been filled, in part, by a reemergence of non-
legal social controls. This revived traditional scheme relies upon ne-
cessity of consensus as the means of decisionmaking and of informal
coercion, and on the use of law as a part of the process of reaching
1534 [Vol. 91-1529
Justice in Japan
consensus. In this process, law often appears to provide a goal as well
as a tool to prompt people to reach a consensus. The paradigm of the
mura is still prevalent in contemporary Japan.
II
I find Professor Haley's paradigms difficult to dispute. They are
tightly packaged and designed to show that Japan maintains an effec-
tive bureaucratic government, sophisticated adjudicatory institutions
and procedures, and various means of informal social controls that fill
whatever void is created by law without sanctions; that official law's
domain is narrow and contained while unofficial group-based controls
are pervasive; and that these characteristics of Japanese law and soci-
ety are traceable to and deeply rooted in its history and traditions.
One has little reason to disagree with the picture that emerges from
these paradigms. This picture, needless to say, starkly contrasts with
that painted of the United States. According to Haley's characteriza-
tions, law in Japan is narrowly contained, divorced from moral or eth-
ical standards, and bereft of enforcement power. His interpretation of
these characteristics is generally favorable for Japan, perhaps too
favorable for the comfort of some Japanese readers.8 Nevertheless, I
find it difficult either to approve or disapprove of Haley's basic charac-
terizations because his analyses are often based on cultural differences,
for which no quantitative evidence is available. He contrasts his char-
acterizations with the United States' legal system, and such characteri-
zations are difficult to prove or disprove; those differences may depend
on a particular field of law or problem under comparison, and may be
a matter of degree. It may, however, be worthwhile to point out some
examples where the author's strokes seem too heavy or overdrawn.
A. "Crime Without Punishment" (ch. 6)
Among major industrial states in the postwar period, Japan alone
has shown a substantial decline in its crime rate in almost all catego-
ries. However, a relatively small number of judges, prosecutors, and
police officers serve its criminal justice system, leading to chronic
criminal trial delays. Professor Haley notes that the criminal process
in Japan moves along "two parallel tracks," - a key that makes the
system work despite its severe institutional constraints (p. 125). The
first track involves a formal institutional process governed by the crim-
inal code and procedural rules, similar to other industrial states.
Within this formal criminal process, however, considerable discretion
is given to Japanese police, prosecutors, and judges. All of them exer-
8. For example, after discussing the "dark side of social controls" and "law as tatemae" in
chapter 8, entitled "Hamlets and Hoodlums," the author concludes that "[flor all the conflict,
inefficiency, and dysfunction manifest in so many aspects of postwar Japanese social, political,
and economic life, Japan maintains a remarkably just as well as stable social order." P. 191.
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cise discretion in such a way that an extremely lenient criminal justice
system has evolved.9
The fact that few offenders see the inside of a jail results from the
informal "second track" of the Japanese criminal justice system. An
emphasis on confession, repentance, and absolution characterizes this
track. In addition to such standard considerations as the gravity of
the offense, the nature and circumstances of the crime, and the age and
prior record of the offender, the following elements may become deter-
minative in the decision whether to report, prosecute, or sentence the
offender: "attitude of the offender in acknowledging guilt, expressing
remorse, and compensating any victims"; and "the victims' response
in expressing willingness to pardon" (p. 129).
Haley argues forcefully that the Japanese second track may con-
tribute to a reduction of crime and the rehabilitation of offenders. He
concludes that the Japanese state has, in effect, abandoned the formal
institutional process - the most coercive of all legitimate instruments
of state control of crime - and has transferred its power to those who
control informal social mechanisms (p. 128). "In contemporary Japan
these powers thus reside with the society at large and its constituent,
lesser communities of family, firm, and friends" (p. 138). He implies
that effectiveness and efficiency result when the state abandons the for-
mal criminal process and relies on informal social means of crime con-
trol. He clearly exaggerates his paradigms: state authority without
power, law without sanctions, and group-based informal controls ef-
fectively filling a vacuum created by state institutional incapacity.
A state cannot maintain a legal order without the effective working
of formal criminal processes. In Japan, the rate of arresting crime sus-
pects remains high, "[p]revailing conviction rates [of those charged]
hover at about 99.5%" (p. 128), and punishments meted out by courts
are fairly standard for each crime category. A formal criminal law
effectively controls crimes and maintains social order. Informal social
controls work within the clearly defined and established legal system.
These mechanisms work because of, not in spite of, the existence of the
state's adequate enforcement power. Haley's analysis of the second
track remains persuasive only insofar as it describes a supplementary
role of the second track for the primary track.
B. "'Administrative Power Constrained" (ch. 7)
Professor Haley examines what he finds a distinguishing character-
9. Large numbers of offenders identified by the police are never reported as suspects to
the procuracy. Of those reported, most are convictable. Yet the vast majority are allowed
to take advantage of summary proceedings that result in minor fines equivalent to a few
hundred dollars. For many others prosecution is routinely suspended. Even though prose-
cution of those that remain seems tantamount to conviction in ordinary trials, sentences are




istic of the Japanese legal system: the Japanese bureaucracy carries
seemingly limitless authority without even a relatively normal degree
of coercive legal power. 10 He describes the Japanese administrative
process as a form of consensual administrative management (p. 144).
In the context of contemporary Japan, administrative agencies must
achieve consent among those most directly affected by administrative
policies and whose cooperation is necessary for the effective implemen-
tation of those policies. In this process of consensus forming, the regu-
lators and the regulated negotiate in both the making and enforcement
of policy. Those subject to governmental direction may gain a "signifi-
cant and often determinative voice in the process of formulating and
implementing policy" (p. 144). This process, in turn, leads to the legi-
timization of the consensus-derived policy through the institutional
empowerment of the "private" bargainer." Haley asserts that the
prevalent use of administrative guidance reflects authority without
power and fits the basic pattern of consensual governance (pp. 160-64).
This chapter describes the distinctive character of administrative
agencies as their lack of enforcement power. Without legal power to
implement their policies, Japanese bureaucrats cannot act coercively.
They remain essentially weak. This characterization contrasts with
Professor Upham's description of administrative agencies in Law and
Social Change in Postwar Japan, 12 which characterizes the administra-
tive agencies as active, assertive, and in the forefront of Japanese social
change. 13 Haley concentrates on economic policies, while Upham fo-
cuses on such evolving fields as environmental protection and minority
rights. Involved government agencies may have acted without legal
enforcement powers in each area; however, administrative agencies do
not lack legal means to implement their policies to the degree to which
Haley asserts. 14 In addition, agencies can actively seek the passage of
10. "In terms of authority, governmental activity in Japan tends to be as unlimited in scope
as in a command economy. In terms of coercive power, however, government officials have only
the legal powers granted to them by statute plus whatever extralegal levers of influence or persua-
sion may be available." P. 144.
11. Haley finds the basic form of consensual management at work in the Japanese govern-
ment's reliance on cartels and trade associations in prewar and postwar economic policy. Pp.
144-53.
12. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). For
Haley's views on Upham's book, see John 0. Haley, Book Review, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY.
243 (1988). I find that the two books, despite their different approaches and focuses, complement
each other well in presenting the Japanese legal cultural characteristics; both are essential for
anyone interested in Japanese law and society.
13. Professor Chalmers Johnson expressed a similar view with regard to the leading role
played by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in evolving industrial policy in
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982).
14. The Administrative Substitute Execution Act of 1948 is a powerful legal tool that an
administrative agency can rely upon when a party under a duty to perform does not satisfy its
obligation. Gyosei dai shikko ho (Law No. 43, 1948). The agency itself can perform the duty in
substitution or can employ a third party to perform the same duty. In either case, the agency can
impose the cost of substitute performance on the original nonperforming party. This law is often
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necessary and adequate legislation that enables them to implement
their policies effectively. In the field of environmental administration,
the Pollution Control Costs Allocation Act's and the Pollution-Vic-
tis Compensation Act 16 exemplify this power. In both instances, ad-
ministrative agencies of the central as well as local governments
assume active roles, backed by legal enforcement power, in assessing
pollution control and remedial costs and imposing these costs on
polluters.
Haley states that "Japan's dependency on consensus can be argued
to have acquired from habit and expectation a particular and self-rein-
forcing legitimacy. In this context, formal law-making and law-en-
forcing processes.., function in large measure as consensus-building
processes rather than avenues for command and coercion" (p. 198). I
find it difficult to disagree with this general cultural explanation. Nev-
ertheless, I find the statement ambiguous as to how cultural elements
matter at the level of individual decisiomaking and behavior. Haley
contends that "the Japanese may be more tolerant of informal enforce-
ment than Americans... because of shared attitudes or simply habit"
(p. 165). He states that such cultural factors matter in situations
where
the official or the private party or both would have acted differently out
of self-interest but for a cultural imperative. Only if, for instance, the
respondent of an official request complies even though doing so runs
counter to economic or other gain could an attitude of submission and
deference to authority be viewed as determinative. [p. 165]
I am unpersuaded, and troubled, by this statement's implication that a
cultural imperative may work against the self-interest of parties in-
volved. Haley makes a similar statement on determinative cultural
factors in Chapter Five, to which I will return later.
C. "'Lawsuits and Lawyers: The Making of a Myth" (ch. 5)
Haley argues that the Japanese have historically been quite litig-
ious. He is indeed one of the first scholars to question the myth of
Japanese nonlitigiousness.17 Contrary to Haley's implied projections,
however, litigation rates in contemporary Japan continue to decrease
used in the field of environmental cleanup. Before World War II, administrative agencies could
impose administrative fines and exercise direct power, including detention and confinement,
under the Administrative Enforcement Act (Gyosei shikko ho, Law No. 84, 1900). However,
those powers were subsequently taken away.
15. Kogai boshi jigyohi jigyosha futan ho (Law No. 133, 1970).
16. Kogai kenko higai no hosho ni kansuru horitsu (Law No. 97, 1987), which in 1988
renamed and subsequently amended the original act, Kogai kenko higai hosho ho (Law No. 111,
1973).
17. John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAP. STUD. 359 (1978). The
debate continues in J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in
Japan, 14 J. JAP. STUD. 111 (1988); Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant:
Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989).
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rather than increase (p. 97). Haley is in a position to explain a curious
paradox: the Japanese like to sue, but, in fact, they do not sue, or they
are becoming less likely to do so.
Haley explains that the Japanese do not litigate because litigation
does not pay. He attributes this trend to three policy and institutional
factors: (1) the government discouraged litigation and encouraged
mediation, especially in the interwar years; (2) the lack of a jury sys-
tem and the career judiciary foster a greater uniformity and certainty
of result; and (3) the official registry systems for real property and
family relationships preclude the need to use the courts in a wide vari-
ety of cases, including adoption, divorce, real property transfers, and
succession (pp. 114-16). In addition, he relies on two cultural factors:
mediation - the availability of third parties who can perform the role
of mediator reduces the need to invoke formal judicial intervention -
and interdependency - the extent of close interdependency relation-
ships from family ties to business dealings precludes resort to the
courts (pp. 115-16).
Haley criticizes the popular image produced by "impressionistic
anthropology" that views the Japanese reluctance to litigate as a par-
ticular phenomenon of a culture that emphasizes social harmony and
cohesion (pp. 114-15). Nevertheless, he feels he must add the above
cultural factors to the institutional ones. He states that people go to
court when they perceive that the "prospective outcome of a litigated
case is more beneficial than other avenues of redress" (p. 116). In
other words, people litigate when they have something to gain. How-
ever, Haley does not fully explain or justify the decision not to sue
when a litigant has something to gain..
The individual decision not to sue involves essentially two scena-
rios: one does not litigate when it does not pay or one does not litigate
even when it does pay. The former is a rational choice and needs no
cultural explanation; the decision could be explained by some or all of
the various institutional constraints that Haley mentions. The latter
case, where one does not litigate even if one may benefit from doing so,
seems nonrational or irrational and calls for some explanation, cul-
tural or otherwise. I cannot accept that the latter case of irrational
choice exists as a cultural pattern, and without an explanation of such
behavior, Haley's reliance on culture to justify irrationality is
unconvincing.
Haley argues that the "use of apology and other customary prac-
tices" may preclude "the enforcement of otherwise applicable legal
rules" (pp. 117-18). He cites, as an example, past acceptance by Japa-
nese women of unequal treatment despite constitutional and statutory
proscriptions regarding gender discrimination (p. 118). In this irra-
tional choice case, "apology and other customary practices" seem in-
adequate and unsatisfactory to explain the decision not to sue,
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especially because this explanation disregards existing institutional
constraints that clearly deter a woman from seeking legal redress in
such a situation. 18
III
Professors Hamilton and Sanders base their book, Everyday Jus-
tice: Responsibility and the Individual in Japan and the United
States,19 on a comparative and empirical study about responsibility
and sanctions, which the authors regard as core aspects of legal cul-
ture. The book asserts that "it is a fundamental human impulse to
seek restitution or retribution when a wrong is done, yet individuals
and societies assess responsibility and allocate punishment for wrong-
doing in different ways" (book jacket).
Based on the data collected from surveys conducted in Detroit,
Michigan and Yokohama and Kanazawa, Japan, the authors compare
both individual and cultural reactions to wrongdoing. They find deci-
sions about justice are influenced by whether or not a social relation
exists between the offender and victim; Americans tend to see actors in
isolation, while Japanese tend to see them in relation to each other.
The Japanese, mindful of role obligations and social ties, relate punish-
ment to the goal of restoring the offender to the social network. In
contrast, Americans punish wrongdoers by isolating them from the
community. The authors suggest two models, "justice among friends"
versus "justice toward strangers," as approaches to analyzing the
processes of ascribing responsibility for wrongdoing and judging ap-
propriate sanctions in modem society. 20
Though Hamilton and Sanders' research focuses primarily on so-
cial psychology, the book informs and illuminates anyone interested in
studying comparative legal culture. Its findings and analysis generally
support some of Haley's assertions while refuting others. Specifically,
Hamilton and Sanders view Japanese nonlitigiousness from a different
perspective and offer more persuasive explanations.
The authors observe that, in comparing Japanese and American
societies, scholars have persistently debated the relative importance of
18. Some institutional and legal constraints under which women sued for employment dis-
crimination are explored in Catherine W. Brown, Japanese Approaches to Equal Rights for Wo.
men: The Legal Framework 12 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 29 (1979). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Danjo koyo kikai kinto ho, Law No. 113) was substan-
tially amended in 1985 (Law No. 45).
19. V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (1992). The book certainly merits a full
and detailed review by some competent specialist. I merely summarize some of its points rele-
vant to Haley's book. The results of surveys in Japanese cities have been published in Japanese.
ZENSUKE ISHIMURA ET AL., SEKININ TO TsUMI No ISHIKI Kozo (1986). The Japanese data
and findings are much more interesting and meaningful when compared and analyzed in this
book with the counterpart data from the United States.
20. HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 19, at 203.
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cultural and structural explanations for observed differences. The de-
bate, the authors believe, has too narrowly centered on the issue of
litigiousness, focusing on litigation rates as evidence of cultural val-
ues.21 They find this debate, in which Haley has been one of the major
contenders, confusing and misleading because it has failed to specify
the particular decision under discussion. Disputants make many deci-
sions while they move on to different levels in the "disputing pyra-
mid."' 22 Haley argues that a nonlitigious ethic is useful in explaining
Japanese legal behavior only if the disputants reach settlements that
do not reflect the expected value of a case. As Hamilton and Sanders
point out, Haley seems to argue that, if culture matters, litigants
should settle for less, and implies that cultural explanations of nonli-
tigiousness predict economically irrational behavior.23
Hamilton and Sanders view the issue of litigiousness as one that
distorts the relations between legal culture and legal structure. They
point out that the debate has tended to equate cultural explanations
with microprocesses and structural explanations with macroprocesses,
looking at cultural values within the narrow context of an individual's
decision whether to sue while looking at the court structure as the
environment within which that decision is made. The authors argue
that "this is an error because it misconstrues the role of legal culture in
shaping a legal system." 24
According to the authors, the debate focusing on litigation rates
has produced some questionable assertions: the Japanese legal system
is fragile because it is under attack from those who want to litigate,
and it is less than legitimate because the Japanese government elites
have managed the legal system to discourage litigation in order to con-
trol the populace.
Hamilton and Sanders, basing their explanations on the survey
data, provide a different perspective and suggest another possible ex-
planation, which I find more persuasive. According to them, the Japa-
nese express support for a less adversarial process and are more willing
to forgo litigation, in order to create a collective benefit, an atmos-
phere of harmony and compromise. In such a society, the authors
argue, those who insist on their legal rights may be seen as free riders,
exploiting the collective benefit, and modem legal reforms in Japan
21. Id. at 188-90.
22. "The disputing pyramid is a metaphor to describe the process by which a large number of
injuries or other unfortunate outcomes become thought of as acts of wrongdoing, are trans-
formed into claims, are pursued through legal or nonlegal channels. Some injuries generate no
claims, some claims are dropped or not otherwise pursued, some are settled before suit, some
suits are settled or dropped before trial, and some decisions are not appealed; the pyramid meta-
phor reflects the fact that the number of cases constantly decreases as claims move up through
the system." Id. at 191.
23. Id. at 189.
24. Id. at 192.
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can be interpreted as a "process of constant adjustments to thwart the
corrosive impact of litigious free riders on a nonlitigious legal
order." 25
The authors suggest that Japanese society may choose to focus on
citizens' preferences when they are concerned with community values
(e.g., harmony, peace) rather than when they are concerned with indi-
vidual problems. They state that, by doing so, Japanese society is not
basing its choices on less valid or less legitimate components of legal
culture; rather, the Japanese legal order legitimately attends to citi-
zens' preferences by reflecting the concerns of a contextual self rather
than the concerns of an individual self.26 I find Hamilton and Sanders'
explanation more pertinent to the issue of litigiousness than Haley's
cultural factors.
In conclusion, the authors suggest two visions of responsibility and
justice, one among friends and the other among strangers, "each
originating in the nature and boundaries of everyday social relation-
ships between people."127 They find that Americans dispense more jus-
tice toward strangers, while the Japanese rely more on justice among
friends. However, their data also show that "Japanese judge strangers
much as Americans do, and would punish strangers at least as
harshly; Japanese simply seem to deal with fewer strangers in their
daily routine."'28 A simple statement like this one, supported by sur-
vey data, adequately explains apparent cultural characteristics and in-
clines toward a more productive comparison of substantive problems
and laws between the United States and Japan.
IV
Two strong trends in contemporary Japan should challenge Profes-
sor Haley's mura paradigm. These are urbanization and
internationalization.
Increasing urbanization in Japan has already destroyed many so-
cial relationships that existed in the traditional mura model. 29 In ur-
ban settings, people are more isolated and alienated. They tend to seek
more justice among strangers than among friends. Informal social
controls become less effective because the web of personal relation-
25. Id. at 193.
26. Id. at 195.
27. Id. at 216.
28. Id. at 217.
29. For example, see THEODORE C. BESTOR, NEIGHBORHOOD TOKYO (1989), which de-
scribes urban neighborhoods in contemporary Japan and effectively challenges assumptions such
as Tokyo as a congeries of villages, displaying direct historical continuity with preindustrial vil-
lage life, and as urban neighborhoods that are little more than administrative or political units.
One should note, however, that the Miyamoto-cho described in the book is a distinctive commu-




ships that once existed is rapidly disintegrating. Business firms and
workplace groups cannot substitute for the tightly knit personal rela-
tions of the mura. After all, these modem organizations have more
definite purposes, such as profit seeking, that require different forms of
commitment from, and place different obligations on, their members.
Consensus for the good of the community becomes much more diffi-
cult to achieve.
Internationalization has also impacted Japan, challenging it to be-
come a more open and transparent society. Increasingly, international
transactions force Japan to face incorporation of diverse foreign ele-
ments into the society: international firms, foreign lawyers, and work-
ers. The negative side of consensus governance has thus become
apparent. Consensus governing has worked and is efficient simply be-
cause, once it is formed, participating parties are bound to honor the
consensus result, and no formal enforcement costs are needed to im-
plement agreed upon policy. The fewer the participants, the easier to
obtain consensus. Consensus governing is effective because its process
excludes many parties whose interests are affected once consensus is
formed. Unfairness of consensual administration to those who do not
have access to the decisionmaking process is apparent, and the costs of
correcting unfairness have become great.30 These developments
should affect and change legal structural arrangements as well as cul-
turally oriented behaviors based on the traditional mura model.
Some years ago, I spoke to a group of American lawyers attending
a Japan-U.S. conference on legal and economic relations.31 After
describing the Japanese legal system in terms of several features that
do not exist in Japan but are often taken for granted by American
lawyers (jury system, contempt of court, a wide range of equitable
remedies, pretrial discovery, punitive damages, class actions, and con-
tingent fees, and so forth), one American lawyer stood up and de-
manded, "How can you do justice in a legal system like that?"
The Japanese legal system is certainly trying to achieve justice
without some of the American legal fixtures. Oftentimes, it is indeed
difficult to explain how we accomplish this, let alone to convince the
American lawyers that a legal system without those basic features
could work and be accepted as fair and legitimate.
Haley certainly provides both an answer to the above question and
a way to look at Japanese law and society. His basic message is that
30. Misusing coercive legal means in this context may sometimes incur disproportionate so-
cial costs. A glaring example of this is the construction of the Narita International Airport,
which remains incomplete after 20 years because of organized protest and resistance by land-
owner-farmers. This example may support Haley's point that consensus forming is important for
administrative agencies before implementing certain policies. See DAVID E. APTER AND
NAGAYO SAWA, AGAINST THE STATE: POLITICS AND SOCIAL PROTEST IN JAPAN (1984).
31. The conference met in Tokyo in 1988. Papers presented at the conference were published
in UNITED STATES/JAPAN COMMERCIAL LAW & TRADE (V. Kusuda-Smick ed., 1990).
1543May 19931
Michigan Law Review
there are other ways of administering justice different from those ac-
cepted in the United States. His paradigms, rooted in the historical
past and traditions of Japan, have produced a persuasive overall image
of law in a consensus-based society. Nevertheless, his paradigms may
be faulted for attributing too much to culture, which is also subject to
change, and for making his overall presentation of Japanese law and
society too distinctive. Overemphasizing Japan's distinctiveness in-
curs a risk of reviving old myths about Japan that Haley effectively has
begun to break down, myths based on an assumption that Japan is
culturally unique.
I do not deny the usefulness and effectiveness of using cultural ex-
planations, especially when one is presenting an overall view of a for-
eign legal system. I would adopt a very similar approach as Haley's if
I were describing the American legal system. However, I find Haley's
heavy emphasis on the distinctiveness of Japanese law and society to
be a little dangerous. Also, I suspect that Haley's emphasis on some
positive and favorable aspects of Japanese law and society may just be
a reflection of his critical view of, and dissatisfaction with, the contem-
porary American legal system. Or, am I reading too much into or out
of this book?
Professor Haley has written one of the most provocative books on
Japanese law and society. The book challenges other comparative
legal scholars to test, refute, amend, and change the author's general
paradigms in each substantive law field as well as to engage in overall
studies of Japanese legal culture.
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APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES. By Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn. Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 284. $39.50.
The assertion of that principle at that time, was the word, 'fitly spoken"
which has proved an "apple of gold" to us. The Union and the Constitu-
tion, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture
was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve
it. The picture was made for the apple - not the apple for the picture.
- Abraham Lincoln1
In his earlier work, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Consti-
tutional Aspiration,2 Professor Gary Jacobsohn 3 compared a number
of modem theories4 of constitutional interpretation with natural law
premises such as Lincoln's theory that the Constitution cannot be in-
terpreted without considering the goals of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.5 He asserted that modem scholars' failure to "relat[e] the
exercise of judicial power to the broader purposes and aspirations of
the [American] polity' 6 was a weakness undermining the validity of
their theories. Lincoln's theory, he argued, was more honest and more
in tune with Professor Jacobsohn's own theories.7 Jacobsohn con-
cluded his work by encouraging judges to "ask themselves how it is
possible for them, as judges, to interpret - understand and apply -
our fundamental law if they reject, or simply are ignorant of, its
presuppositions."8 In Apple of Gold, an analysis of constitutionalism
in Israel, he follows the attempts of the Israeli Supreme Court to de-
velop its own constitutional interpretive theory and suggests that the
1. Apple of Gold begins with this quotation. P. 3. It is not the first time, however, that
Professor Jacobsohn has used it. The "apple of gold" metaphor appeared in an earlier work that
outlined his theory of constitutional interpretation. GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION ch. 6 (1986). The duplication of the ref-
erence is no accident, since Apple of Gold continues to expound upon Professor Jacobsohn's
constitutional theory. See infra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. The quotation is attributed to
Lincoln, even though he apparently never included it in a speech. P. 4; see also JACOBSOHN,
supra, at 102-03. The reference is to a passage from the Bible: "A word fitly spoken is like apples
of gold in pictures of silver." Proverbs 25:11.
2. JACOBSOHN, supra note 1.
3. Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College.
4. Professor Jacobsohn critiqued the theories of Roscoe Pound, Ronald Dworkin, Raoul Ber-
ger, Thomas C. Grey, and John Hart Ely.
5. JACOBSOHN, supra note 1, ch. 7.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Professor Jacobsohn stands among other proponents of departmentalism such as Sanford
Levinson and Stephen Macedo. SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHOR-
ITY 13 (1992). Departmentalists argue that each branch of government has the right to develop
its own, equally authoritative, constitutional interpretation. Id. at 12-13.
8. JACOBSOHN, supra note 1, at 140.
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attempt, at least, comports with Lincoln's, and Jacobsohn's, natural
law ideals.
Apple of Gold compares Israeli and American constitutionalism
and evaluates efforts to transplant American principles to Israel. Pro-
fessor Jacobsohn uses the Declarations of each nation to provide the
framework for analyzing the similarities and differences between the
two polities. The American Declaration of Independence embodies
the "ethos of individualism" (pp. 4-5). In contrast, the 1948 Israeli
Declaration of Independence affirms the existence of the Jewish people
as a nation (p. 7). This contrast between individualism and national
identity provides the framework for Jacobsohn's reflections.
In the first two chapters, Professor Jacobsohn lays the foundations
for his comparisons. In "Two Declarations" (pp. 3-9) and "Two Con-
stitutions" (pp. 9-17), he describes the fundamental distinctions be-
tween the two political systems. The American Declaration provides
for natural justice principles that "are effectively the basis of na-
tionhood" (p. 9). Those principles, he asserts, officially achieve au-
thority in the Constitution, thereby giving both documents a singular
purpose (p. 9). The Israeli Declaration embodies a similar commit-
ment to individual rights principles, 9 but they are not the sole vision of
that document. Instead, they share space with the vision of the Jewish
people as a nation. The competition between its two visions is why,
Jacobsohn asserts, Israel has not achieved a written constitution (p. 9).
Consequently, constitutional development has taken place in the
courts and, on a parallel track, in the Knesset.10 In "Alternative Plu-
ralisms" (ch. 2), Jacobsohn argues that, although both states contain
subgroups of diverse origins, the difference in national vision leads to
divergent constitutional processes (pp. 18-54). The American process
leads to assimilation, and the Israeli process begets stratification. Pro-
fessor Jacobsohn poses "the one great American counterexample, Na-
tive Americans" as a comparison (p. 52). He describes the
development of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 196811 as a noble effort,
but one doomed to unsatisfactory results because it was "grounded on
premises that ignored the essential fact that Native Americans were a
minority who did not fit the prevailing model of constitutional and
political pluralism" (p. 19). Protecting group autonomy, a "constitu-
tional anomaly" in America, is the norm in Israel (p. 23). Not only
9. The second section of the Declaration includes the following:
The State of Israel will.., be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by
the Hebrew prophets; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens,
without distinction of race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship,
education and culture ....
P. 7.
10. The Knesset is the Israeli legislative body.
11. Pp. 18-25. The Act is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1312, 1321-1326, 1331,
1341 (1988). See generally Donald L. Burnett, Jr.,An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil
Rights Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 557 (1972).
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does Israel recognize group identities, its government supports their
continuing vitality. Accordingly, Israel has a strong sense of commu-
nity (pp. 35-44) and departs from traditional American-style republi-
canism (pp. 44-52).
These themes provide the undercurrent for the next four chapters,
in which Professor Jacobsohn describes the development of constitu-
tionalism in Israel. In early efforts, the Israeli Supreme Court at-
tempted to define who is a Jew. Jacobsohn infers that, in deciding that
a Jew who converted to Catholicism is no longer a Jew for the pur-
poses of the Law of Return 12 but the children of a Jewish father and a
non-Jewish mother are,13 the Court tried to balance the twin bases of
Jewishness - religion and individual choice. Although the decisions
appear somewhat contradictory,1 4 they represented a compromise
which chose an objective, secular definition of nationality (pp. 64-66).
While the American perspective would demand this effort (p. 71), the
Israeli vision rejected itl5 and refused to diminish the religious element
of Jewish nationality.1 6 Jacobsohn predicts, however, that since "secu-
lar, democratic aspirations" are one of the two competing fundamen-
tal visions in Israel, they will continue to surface in the debate. 17
Chapter Four analyzes both Israel's failure to adopt a written con-
stitution and the mechanisms developed in its place (pp. 95-135). Pro-
fessor Jacobsohn suggests first that America's ability to produce a
written constitution was possible because there was consensus on the
"set of political principles that would serve as developmental guide-
lines of the nation" (p. 104). Israel, on the other hand, has multiple
visions whose priority has not been settled (pp. 100-06). Thus, Jacob-
sohn perceives the ongoing constitutional debate as Israel's attempt to
solidify its vision.
12. Pp. 63-69 (discussing Rufeisen v. Minister of Interior, 16(4) P.D. 2428 (1962), translated
in SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL (SPECIAL VOLUME) 1 (Asher F.
Landau & Peter Elman eds., 1971)) [hereinafter SELECTED JUDGMENTS]. Rufeisen is commonly
known as the Brother Daniel case.
13. Pp. 70-80 (discussing Shalit v. Minister of Interior, 23(2) P.D. 477 (1970), translated in
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 12, at 35). The halakic (orthodox) definition of a Jew is a
person "whose mother was Jewish or converted to Judaism." P. 55 n.1. For commentary on
Shalit, see Benjamin Akzin, Who Is a Jew? A Hard Case, 5 ISR. L. REv. 259 (1970).
14. Rufeisen seems to hold that Jewishness is based on religion, yet Shalit finds Jewishness
outside of religion. Justice Landau's concurrence in Rufeisen provides some consistency, sug-
gesting that Rufeisen's religious decision "denied his national past." SELECTED JUDGMENTS,
supra note 12, at 22 (emphasis added). Shalit's denial of Jewishness' religious basis apparently
did not cross the national line.
15. After Shalit, the Knesset amended the Law of Return to require both the Orthodox
definition of Jewishness, supra note 13, and nonmembership in any other religion. "In effect,
then, the secular position on the separability of religion and nationality was rejected." P. 71.
16. "[U]nlike the American example, religion in Israel is more than an influence on national
identity; it is a constituent part of that identity." P. 79.
17. "The challenge of balancing these commitments in a manner that retains respect for the
constitutional sanctity of both of them will doubtless ensure the continuing presence of this issue
on Israel's political and legal agenda." P. 80.
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Additionally, Chapter Four analyzes the development of judicial
review in Israel against the background of judicial review in America
(pp. 110-35). Professor Jacobsohn depends heavily on an article by
Robert A. Burt,18 who "maintains that the emergence of judicial re-
view in both countries is best understood as an institutional response
to the presence of fundamental societal conflict" (p. 113). As exam-
ples of fundamental conflicts in American law, Jacobsohn cites the
Federalist-Republican clashes preceding Marbury v. Madison 19 and
the divisiveness of slavery leading to the Missouri Compromise and
eventually Dred Scott.20 In Israeli history, he cites the 1967 Six Day
War as the conflict preceding the Elon Moreh decision2 l and the polit-
ical party struggles surrounding the Bergman case.22 However, while
the U.S. Supreme Court used the written Constitution to establish ju-
dicial review23 and judicial supremacy,2 4 Professor Jacobsohn indi-
cates that the absence of a written constitution led the Israeli Supreme
Court to develop a position of judicial restraint (pp. 124-32).
Although its decisions have been central in many divisive political is-
sues,25 the Court has intervened cautiously, preferring to leave many
fundamental decisions to the legislature.2 6 Without the certainty of a
written document, Jacobsohn favors the prudence of the Court's cho-
sen path.27
This position is consistent with the views Professor Jacobsohn in-
troduced in his earlier work, The Supreme Court and the Decline of
18. Robert A. Burt, Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2013 (1989).
19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20. Pp. 115-18 (discussing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
21. Pp. 113-15. In Elon Moreh, the Court invalidated the military seizure of Arab-owned
lands. Dwikat v. Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1 (1980), translated in digest form in 15 ISR. L. REV. 131(1980). Because the decision favored Arab property rights over Jewish settlers, it represented a
bold move on the Court's part. See Burt, supra note 18, at 2071. Elon Moreh was the name of
the settlement from which the Jewish settlers were evicted.
22. Pp. 124-29 (discussing Bergman v. Minister of Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969), translated
in 4 ISR. L. REv. 559 (1969)). Bergman struck down the Financing Law of 1969, which only
financed the election campaigns of candidates from parties already represented in the current
Knesset. Justice Landau's opinion invalidated the provision because it conflicted with the en-
trenched Basic Law establishing electoral equality. P. 126. For reactions to the Bergman case,
see Benjamin Akzin, Comment, 4 ISR. L. REV. 576 (1969); Peter Elman, Comment, 4 ISR. L.
REv. 565 (1969); Claude Klein, Comment, 4 ISR. L. REV. 569 (1969).
23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
24. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
25. "[Tlhe Court has already become a principal player in the great issues that divide the
body politic." P. 132.
26. Professor Jacobsohn argues that Justice Landau and others did not want to "inappropri-
ately enmesh the judiciary in controversies more amenable to political resolution." P. 130. In
this philosophy, one sees the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court's "political question" doc-
trine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27. "[J]udicial restraint in Israel means avoiding judgments of finality in the absence of a
final settlement of regime principles." P. 132.
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Constitutional Aspiration, in which he theorized that "constitutional
aspiration" requires the participation of all branches of government,
not just the judiciary.28 The example of Lincoln's opposition to the
U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision resurfaces in Apple of Gold,
where Jacobsohn compares Lincoln's actions (pp. 117-20) to the Knes-
set's responses to the early Israeli Supreme Court decisions.29 He sug-
gests that Lincoln's behavior was labeled as disobedient because
Americans viewed their Court's power of judicial review as "fully set-
tied" (p. 119). Because the Israeli review power has not been so en-
trenched, its citizenry viewed the Knesset's reactions as appropriate.
Professor Jacobsohn patently favors the Israeli approach.30 He even
advises the American polity to follow suit, so that "they too can profit
from a constitutional arrangement that allows them to achieve a
higher level of clarity in the articulation, development, and application
of constitutional principle" (p. 135). This is certainly a provocative
call for action, but it is unlikely to change almost 200 years of estab-
lished doctrine.3 1
Chapter Five's discussion of Israeli censorship law (pp. 136-43)
and election law decisions (pp. 150-62) and Chapter Six's free speech
analysis (pp. 177-227) serve as the background for Professor Jacob-
sohn's examination of the Israeli Supreme Court's selective use of
American rights-based constitutional theory. Again, he returns to his
two themes, the Declaration's dual aspirations and the absence of a
written constitution, to validate the Justices' choices. When his advo-
cacy of the Israeli Court's activist pursuit of individual rights appears
at odds with his prior criticism of similar behavior by American jurists
and scholars, he claims that the Israeli Court's activism is acceptable
due to the shared nature of constitutional interpretation in Israel (pp.
143-62). "[T]he constraints imposed on the courts by the constitu-
tional principle of parliamentary supremacy legitimates a more active
role for the courts in construing the law."'32 Professor Jacobsohn fur-
ther justifies the Israeli Court's rights-oriented activist role for its edu-
28. For a discussion of Professor Jacobsohn's "constitutional aspiration" theory, see Book
Note, Natural Law and the Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REv. 874 (1988). Burgess, supra note 7,
at 13-22, discusses the pros and cons of departmentalist theories, including Jacobsohn's.
29. The Knesset did not merely resist "wrong" Supreme Court decisions; it amended Basic
Laws to overrule them. P. 71 (discussing amendment to the Law of Return following Shalit); see
also supra note 15 and accompanying text. For one Justice's endorsement of these reactions, see
p. 129 n.94.
30. "A Court pursuing the more libertarian aspirations of the nation's founding agenda can
and ought to be checked by a Knesset that is more sensitive to the other parts of that agenda
." P. 135.
31. This is not surprising, since it follows his own ideas. Professor Jacobsohn "[r]egrettably"
recognizes that his "is not a widely shared view, mainly because... judges and scholars ...
embrace the teaching contained in the aphorism that the Constitution is what the judges say it
is." P. 134. For more objective reasons why such views are not widely shared, see Burgess, supra
note 7, at 19-22.
32. P. 152. The absence of a written constitution makes judicial legislation easier because
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cational function. 33 Again, he asserts that the texts for this
pedagogical task of the "republican schoolmaster" (p. 162) have been,
and should be, borrowed selectively from America. 34 The educative
role is particularly crucial and risky, he asserts, because the Court is
developing and interpreting its constitutional text simultaneously (pp.
168-73). On a parallel track, the Knesset also adds "lessons" regard-
ing the sanctity of Israel as a Jewish state.35 Thus, the Court's desire
to educate the populace on democratic individual rights theory must
not overshadow the other aspiration of Israeli constitutionalism - the
preservation of the Jewish state.
No issue demonstrates the differences between the American and
Israeli constitutional visions more clearly than that of free speech.
Chapter Six delves deeply into free speech cases from both nations to
drive home the distinction (pp. 177-227). In particular, Professor
Jacobsohn contrasts the American tolerance of the Nazi march
through Skokie, Illinois 36 with the Israeli suppression of Rabbi Meir
Kahane.37 Whereas the American vision requires tolerance, "Israeli
law, in its criminalization of various types of offensive speech, resists a
Holmesian toleration of what we hate.. ." (p. 219). Viewed from the
perspective of its fundamental vision, each nation's approach "can
"[t]he judge there cannot be accused of rewriting a text (in the case of rights) that does not exist."
P. 157. Nonetheless,
to the inevitable charge that the Court in creating such a right is usurping the authority of
the Knesset, it can simply be pointed out that it is a strange, or at any rate benign, usurpa-
tion that can last only as long as the victimized body accepts through its own inaction the
act perpetrated against it.
P. 157. In America, Jacobsohn argues, the Court reigns supreme, and Congress cannot effec-
tively restrain unwarranted excursions from the fundamental vision. Accordingly, judicial activ-
ism is potentially more dangerous. Pp. 152-57.
33. Pp. 162-73. "Mhe Court has a special obligation to articulate and explain political prin-
ciples [because] ... Israel does not have a strong democratic tradition." P. 163.
34. Pp. 164-73. Professor Jacobsohn suggests that Israeli judges appreciate and emulate
American jurists' use of legal scholarship in their opinions. Particularly, "the extensive Ameri-
can literature in constitutional theory is a subject of more than casual interest." P. 146. One
suspects that Professor Jacobsohn hopes Apple of Gold and its ideas are among those the Israelis
import.
35. "[The scope of the course is not fully within the control of its teachers," because "the
Court must now incorporate [the Knesset's enactments] into its own syllabus .... P. 166.
36. "We live in a society that is very conscious of racial and religious differences, in which
open discussion of important public issues will often require reference to racial and religious
groups, often in terms which members of those groups, and others, would consider insulting and
degrading." P. 177 (quoting Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 691 (1978)). "[S]peech may not
be punished merely because it offends." P. 177 (quoting 447 F. Supp. at 697). Frank Collin was
the leader of a group of American Nazis who wanted to march through Skokie, a town densely
populated with Holocaust survivors. P. 178.
37. "A near certainty that the feelings of a religious or ethnic minority be really and harshly
hurt, by publication of a deviant speech, is enough to justify limiting that speech." P. 177 (quot-
ing Kahane v. Broadcasting Auth., 41(3) P.D. 255, 295-96 (1987)). A digest of Kahane appears
at 23 IsR. L. REV. 515 (1989). Rabbi Kahane led the Jewish Defense League, whose anti-Arab
platform advocated acts of terrorism, abusive commentary, and other provocative behavior. P.
178.
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readily be assimilated into an argument for individual liberty rightly
understood" (p. 227).
Professor Jacobsohn concludes as he began: with Israel's continu-
ing tug-of-war over adopting a written constitution, especially a bill of
rights (oh. 7). He infers that American critics who chastise Israel's
ambivalence as false constitutionalism 38 have ignored once again the
twin goals of Israel's political culture.39 Consequently, Jacobsohn ex-
horts Israelis to remain deaf to the critics and continue their quest to
forge a "picture of silver" that truly fits their "apple of gold."
In his introduction to Apple of Gold, Professor Jacobsohn pro-
claims two goals:
What I have sought to do in this book is contrast particular features of
the constitutional cultures of Israel and the United States that are rele-
vant to an assessment of constitutional transplantation. While these two
polities constitute the specific focus of the analysis, my hope is to con-
tribute more broadly to an improved understanding of the nature of con-
stitutionalism. [p. 12]
Professor Jacobsohn succeeds admirably in his first goal. His exam-
ples are thought provoking and reflect the depth of his research and
the stellar sources to which he had access.40 As a historical account of
Israel's constitutional struggles, Apple of Gold is both educational and
engaging. Regarding his second goal, whether Jacobsohn has suc-
ceeded in illuminating the current constitutional discourse depends on
whether one finds his theory of constitutional aspiration persuasive. If
it is persuasive, the Israeli experience serves as an example of how the
exercise of constitutional development is properly shared between the
courts, the legislature, and ultimately the people. If it remains uncon-
vincing, one must applaud nonetheless Apple of Gold's energetic efforts
to display Professor Jacobsohn's "republican schoolmaster"
aspirations.
- Cynthia A.M. Stroman
38. "The raison d'etre of constitutional government is the preservation of liberty; whatever
other goals it may have, a regime that identifies itself as constitutional, but fails to pursue this
goal, is simply not what it purports to be." P. 231.
39. "[T]he presence or absence of such a document is not essential to a determination of
whether constitutionalist claims are legitimate .... [especially] where a commitment to liberal
democratic principles is to be reconciled with the establishment of the state as a homeland for a
particular people." Pp. 235-36.
40. In addition to thorough historical and legal research, Jacobsohn interviewed, among
others, six former or current Justices of the Israeli Supreme Court.
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ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES: THE IN-
TERPLAY BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES IN THE US
AND THE EEC. By Mdrio Marques Mendes. Brussels: Editions de
l'Universit6 de Bruxelles. 1991. Pp. xii, 285. 1,523 BF.
In Antitrust in a World of Interrelated Economies, Maxio Marques
Mendes' provides an insightful account of the conflict between anti-
trust and trade policy objectives in both the United States and the
European Community (EC). 2 His main contention is simple indeed:
antitrust, which aims to promote competition, and trade policy, which
aims to protect domestic industry, operate at cross-purposes. Mendes
skillfully elaborates this thesis throughout his book, showing the
reader how the two policies conflict and how the enforcers of trade
policy might better recognize the concerns behind antitrust policy.
His book is full of insights into policymaking and decisionmaking at
all levels. Mendes traces the history of antitrust and trade enforce-
ment in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
as adroitly as he discusses infighting between the Department of Jus-
tice and the International Trade Commission. His remarkable ability
to discuss two major policies in two legal systems at once is ultimately
the real strength of this book.
Mendes divides the text into three parts. The first, "International
Trade and International Antitrust: An Overview," summarizes the
history of trade liberalization in the GATT and trade protection de-
spite the GATT (pp. 19-26). It then reviews the history of antitrust
enforcement, noting that despite its mainly economic bases, one early
political motivation for enforcement stemmed from an association of
cartels with Naziism (p. 34). Mendes points up the limitations of
purely domestic antitrust enforcement and decries the lack of regula-
tion of restrictive business practices on the international level.3 His
1. Mf-io Marques Mendes practices law in Lisbon and Brussels and teaches International
Trade Law at the Center for European Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University. -Ed.
2. Mendes' strategy is more global than most. Many scholars have noted the interrelation-
ship of antitrust and trade in the American setting, see, eg., Harvey M. Applebaum, The Inter-
face of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 409
(1987), or in the European setting. See, eg., Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy:
A Peaceful Coexistence? European Community Perspective, (pts. 1 & 2) 17 INTL. Bus. LAW. 58
(1989), 17 ITrL. Bus. LAW. 115 (1989). The scholars who explore the relationship between
antitrust and trade in the European context often focus on conflicts between Member State indus-
trial policy and EC competition law, rather than examining the conflicts between the policies at
the Community level. See HELEN PAPACONTANTINOU, FREE TRADE AND COMPETITION IN
THE EEC: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 202-08 (1988).
3. Others, too, have called for greater international coordination in the antitrust area. Sir
Leon Brittan, former Commissioner in charge of competition, called for the inclusion of antitrust
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discussion of the lack of international antitrust enforcement is slightly
out of date in that it fails to mention the 1991 agreement between the
EC and the United States to coordinate antitrust enforcement. 4 While
currently in force, France is presently challenging the validity of the
agreement in front of the European Court of Justice.5
The second part of the book, "The U.S. and EEC Antitrust Sys-
tems," completes the foundation for the intricate arguments of Part
III. Mendes' taxonomy of the interrelationships relevant to his in-
quiry begins in this part. He skillfully addresses the practical aspects
of enforcement in the U.S. and the EC before finding that "all these
aspects of antitrust enforcement cannot be looked at separately. They
are all interrelated" (p. 68). Mendes further notes that, especially in
the U.S., antitrust is not only complex in itself but also constitutes part
of a broader economic policy (p. 65). The importance of economic
criteria in American antitrust evaluations cannot be underestimated,
while economics plays a lesser role in Community decisionmaking.
6
Mendes goes too far, however, when he characterizes the role of eco-
on the agenda of the next GATT round. He said: "An international body with powers to seek
out and destroy cartels may come one day, but the international community is clearly not ready
to contemplate this possibility yet. For the time being we should think about a clear agreement
as to the rules relating to cartels .. " Brittan Calls for GAT77 Code on Competition, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3, 1992 (Econews section), available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
ALLNWS File.
4. Competition Laws Co-operation Agreement 1991 (EEC-USA), 4 C.M.L.R. 823 (1991).
The agreement, signed on September 23, 1991, is not legally binding but sets up a formal proce-
dure for the exchange of information about companies suspected of antitrust infringement. The
arrangement does not compromise the independent decisionmaking of each legal system's au-
thorities, but both sides have agreed to abide by the principle of international comity, whereby
each side could request that its interests be taken into account by the other. Antitrust authorities
from the United States and the EC first met in November, 1991. See Coopers & Lybrand, Trade
Relations EC-USA and EC-Canada, EC COMMENTARIES, Apr. 15, 1993, § 5.10, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, EURSCP File.
5. Case C-327/91, France v. Commission (initiated on 16 Dec. 1991 (pending)). A notifica-
tion of the bringing of the action is published at 1992 O.J. (C 28) 4. France argues that the
agreement with the United States is ultra vires because it is not an administrative agreement, but
an international agreement under Article 228(1) of the Treaty of Rome that must be concluded
by the Council. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC
TREATY] art. 228(1); Competition: France Mounts Court Challenge to EEC-USAnti-Trust Agree-
ment, EUR. REP., Jan. 11, 1992, at 4 (Business Brief No. 1734), available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, ALLNWS File; Charles Goldsmith, EC Defends Its U.S. Antitrust Pact, INTL. HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 11, 1992 (Finance Section), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLNWS File; see
also Alan J. Riley, Nailing the Jellyfish: The Illegality of the EC/US Government Competition
Agreement, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 101 (1992) (arguing that the agreement is ultra
vires).
6. Ascertaining the precise role economics will play in future competition evaluations in the
EC is difficult because of the appointment this year of a new Competition Commissioner, Karel
van Miert. The former Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, recognized the importance of economic
efficiency criteria: "[O]ur approach is an economic, rather than a legal one. Competition law is
rightly concerned with substance rather than form." SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY
AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 37 (1991). There are fears, how-
ever, that van Miert will deemphasize economics:
In anti-trust issues, Mr[.] Van Miert says, competition should not be the only criterion:
industrial, social and other factors also apply. Indeed they dd, but they are not the business
1553
1554 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1552
nomics in the EC as "minor."'7 In support of his contention, Mendes
cites to the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Sixteenth Reports on Com-
petition Policy, but he neglects to examine more recent reports that
place a greater emphasis on economic efficiency in the EC.8
Having found the goals of antitrust to be superior to those of trade
policy by virtue of their promotion of competition and free trade,
Mendes defines the useful limits of domestic antitrust policy by com-
mencing a detailed investigation of the vagaries of international sub-
ject matter jurisdiction (pp. 86-101). The foreign sovereign immunity,
act-of-state, foreign sovereign compulsion, and other defenses may
prevent a domestic antitrust policy from functioning effectively in the
international arena (pp. 94-101). Mendes notes that where an indus-
try can choose between bringing an antitrust suit or an import relief
proceeding, it will invariably choose the latter because the antitrust
defenses will not apply (p. 166).
Both legal systems tend to downplay international comity consid-
erations.9 Moreover, both the U.S. and the EC tend to encourage or
approve antitrust violations abroad, as the U.S. statute exempting ex-
port cartels from antitrust suits illustrates.10 A fuller discussion of the
statutory exemptions to the U.S. and EC antitrust laws would have
of the competition commissioner.... If the result is to be a productive compromise, it is
above all necessary that the competition commissioner should fight his corner.
Keep Competing, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at 13.
7. Mendes claims that, "[i]n a word, economic efficiency considerations when confronted
with other concerns, be they market integration, the protection of specific industrial sectors or
regions or even that of users and workers, have consistently played a minor role in the context of
EEC competition policy." P. 83 (emphasis added).
8. See p. 118 nn.15-17; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIST
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 42 (1992) (noting "one important limitation on the possibil-
ity of relying on cooperation and restructuring operations: companies can not be allowed to
eliminate effective competition"). Mendes also cites to the earlier reports when he discusses the
role of industrial policy in the Commission's decisionmaking. Pp. 241-43. There, he mentions
the Sixth, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Reports, but it is striking that the Seventeenth Report is
less openly in favor of accommodating industrial policy concerns in competition decisions than
the earlier reports. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTEENTH RE-
PORT ON COMPETITON POLICY 51 (1988); see also COMMISSION, XXIsT REPORT at 42-43. In-
dustrial policy is, however, receiving greater legitimation outside the competition area: the Single
European Act of 1986 added Article 130f to the Treaty, which aims to "strengthen the scientific
and technological basis of European industry." EEC TREATY art. 130f. If the Maastricht Treaty
is ratified by the Member States, an entire title of the Treaty will be devoted to industrial policy.
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [MAASTRICHT TREATY] art. G(38) (replacing EEC TREATY
Title VI with Title XIII, art. 130).
9. Pp. 86-101. The agreement between the United States and the EC takes comity into ac-
count, however. See supra note 4.
10. Pp. 70-71. The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988), grants
limited immunity to export trade associations that do not restrain domestic trade or the export
trade of other domestic enterprises. Webb-Pomerene associations may still be held to violate the
EC antitrust laws, as in the Wood Pulp decision. Joined cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-17/85,
and 125-29/85, A. Ahlstrim Oy v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988)
(holding no foreign sovereign compulsion defense because export cartel was authorized but not
compelled by the Webb-Pomerene Act).
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been appreciated, especially as the U.S. exemption for export cartels11
and the EC exemption for crisis cartels 12 seem to accommodate trade
policy objectives.
At this point, Mendes attempts a preliminary comparison between
the U.S. and EC antitrust systems that rings true in most respects but
becomes deeply problematic when he explores it further in Part III.
He asserts that "[t]he concentration one finds in the Common Market
is in striking opposition to the decentralized U.S. institutional and en-
forcement structure" (p. 82). This is surely correct. The United
States has a greater arsenal of antitrust enforcement agencies and in-
struments, while in the EC the Commission has greater powers than
the Justice Department and the F.T.C. combined. 13 Moreover, the
American approach to antitrust is more deeply rooted in concerns of
economic efficiency than that of the Community, with its "objective of
market integration ... [as] the most important of the goals of EEC
competition policy" (p. 74). Given the centralization in the EC, it is
not surprising that "antitrust appears more obviously as one set of
principles which has to be balanced against other equally relevant con-
siderations" (p. 138). In the United States, the reconciliation of anti-
trust with other policies, such as trade, may be achieved through
interagency negotiation rather than intraagency decision, as the au-
thor's explanation of the LTV-Republic merger case illustrates so
well.14
The author's logical assumptions in his preliminary comparison
between the two antitrust systems in Part II lead to perplexing conclu-
sions when applied in Part III. Mendes finds that, "at least in theory,"
the reconciliation of trade and antitrust should be easier in the EC
11. Mendes discusses U.S, statutory exemptions. Pp. 70-73. The export cartel exception is
the most important. See supra note 10.
12. "Crisis cartels" are organizations of producers in industries under severe economic pres-
sure. In general, the Community has a wider and more flexible range of antitrust exemptions
than the United States. See pp. 73-81. The Commission may grant individual or group exemp-
tions for those restrictive practices which violate Article 85(1) of the Treaty, but satisfy the
criteria of Article 85(3). See EEC TREATY art. 85. The Article 85(3) criteria are often met, so
the number of exemptions granted is quite high. Two of the most utilized group exemptions
concern specialization agreements and research and development agreements. Commission Reg-
ulation 417/85 on the Application of Art. 85(3) to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 1985
O.J. (L 53) 1; Commission Regulation 418/85 on the Application of Art. 85(3) to Categories of
Research and Development Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5.
13. See p. 82 (noting in particular that the Commission has the power to grant individual and
block exemptions from the antitrust rules, and that its "notices" have greater weight than the
Department of Justice's "guidelines").
14. Pp. 239-48. The LTV-Republic steel merger was originally prohibited by the Depart-
ment of Justice. The Department reasoned that a merger between the third and fourth largest
producers would increase concentration in the domestic market and likely lead to higher prices.
After the President and the Commerce Department pressured the Justice Department to change
its ruling, it upheld the merger, albeit with certain conditions attached. See pp. 239-48; Peter
Bruce & Terry Dodsworth, Republic-LTV Deal is Approved, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1984, at 42;
Rescued Merger, Lost Opportunity, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1984, at A22.
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than the U.S. because of the centralization of power in the Commis-
sion and the fact that all EC trade laws contain "Community interest"
clauses requiring the consideration of other policies and interests
before adopting trade sanctions (p. 168). He goes on to find, however,
that the clauses do not really work; the Commission consistently up-
holds the interests of industry over the interest of the public in free
competition (p. 169). Mendes becomes rather irate with the
Commission:
The rare cases in which it is said that competition considerations were
taken into account do not show a change of attitude on the part of the
Community authorities. The approach is confusing, if not puzzling; the
motivation is poor, if at all existent; the inconsistencies are blatant if one
compares such cases with usual analysis of EC institutions. [p. 171]
He finds that, "[i]n short, what EC institutions are doing is promoting
Community industrial policy.... The risk indeed exists, then, that
the promotion of an industrial policy within the Community... may
degenerate into a clear expression of outright protectionism."' 5 The
U.S. situation compares favorably with that in the EC. Mendes notes:
Conversely, and strikingly enough, it is in the United States - where
"public interest" clauses in trade laws are ineffective or non-existent, and
where there are not only one but several agencies involved in antitrust
and trade matters - that, through the efforts of the antitrust enforce-
ment authorities, competition arguments have been regularly submitted,
sometimes successfully, in trade proceedings .... The fact is that much
more was done, in apparently a not so favorable legal and institutional
environment, than in the EEC, to bridge those differences. [p. 177]
Yet, in the final part of the book, Mendes inexplicably reverses his
position again. The book begins to feel like a detective novel - the
United States is "guilty" because it has no "public interest" clauses,
too many agencies, and the common law tradition. No, actually the
EC is at fault because its "Community interest" clauses have no real
effect. Suddenly, on page 243, the United States is fingered again:
"while in the EEC antitrust is understandably balanced against other
policy concerns, any attempt to adopt the same approach in the
United States... may be unrealistic." Mendes offers little support for
this last reversal. He cites several of the Commission's Reports on
Competition Policy and Article 130f of the Treaty of Rome, but gives
no practical "in-the-trenches" advice as before on how the system re-
ally works.16 As a result, his conclusion sounds a little hollow: "In
15. Pp. 173-74. Many scholars have accused the Community of using industrial policy to
attain protectionist goals. See, eg., Derek Ridyard, An Economic Perspective on the EC Merger
Regulation, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 247, 252 (1990) ("[C]ompanies based outside the EC
may find that ... the Commission will be more prone to upholding Member States' public
interest objections to mergers if the bidder is a US or Japanese firm than one based in the EC.").
16. Compare the author's summary conclusions about the EC's balancing of policy concerns
with his earlier, more measured statement:
Interestingly enough, it is just possible that the evolution in the system of judicial review in
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the EEC, a centralized institutional system formulates antitrust rules
and principles and enforces them in a flexible way.. ." (p. 265).
To be sure, Mendes' primary objective is not to compare the anti-
trust-trade balancing in the U.S. and the EC, but to communicate the
need in both legal systems for trade protection decisions to take anti-
trust enforcement into account. Mendes further hopes that where the
relevant authorities do not take antitrust into account, they will be
made "aware of their own anticompetitive options and provid[e] those
who are thereby affected with clear explanations for such policy
choices" (p. 146). Nevertheless, his brief comparison between the two
legal systems in Part II and further analysis of each system in Part III
lead the reader to expect a more complete comparison of the pluses
and minuses of each philosophy for reconciling antitrust and trade
objectives.
Mendes notes that there has been and will continue to be a certain
amount of "cross-fertilization" between the two approaches to recon-
ciliation (p. 266). Complete harmonization is unlikely and undesir-
able, given the historical attachment of Americans to economic
reasoning and of Europeans to industrial policy. Yet a more thorough
account of the way each legal system balances antitrust and trade
would enable the reader to decide what kind of cross-fertilization is
beneficial for each system and to what extent. It would also help
pinpoint what kind of international antitrust cooperation would be
practical and successful. Having completed his interdisciplinary anal-
ysis, Mendes stops just short of completing a compelling comparative
law analysis.
The impressive observations and analyses in this book illustrate
how certain trade measures in each legal system contravene the policy
goals of antitrust. Mendes' discussion in Part III of how each U.S.
trade law - except countervailing duties - runs afoul of the antitrust
laws is superb. Mendes coyly asks "whether there is any fundamental
reason for applying antitrust rules and principles in domestic trade
while setting them aside in what concerns foreign trade which is dealt
with by the import relief laws" (p. 144), before quite convincingly
showing that all the fundamental reasons point the other way. He
reveals that the only kind of dumping that violates the antitrust laws is
predatory dumping, which is also the least likely to occur. 17 He ad-
mits, however, that scrapping the antidumping laws is not feasible,
the trade law context in the EEC - certainly not as complete and sophisticated as the one
existing in the U.S. - which has been taking place (as well as the changes in the judicial
structure) may end up in a greater scrutiny of the assessment made by EC institutions of the
"public interest" element in trade cases, which may in due time influence the institutions'
approach under that concept.
P. 197 (emphasis added).
17. Pp. 149-51. See generally Charles F. Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive Market-
place: When is an Antitrust Response Appropriate?, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 421 (1988).
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given the weakness of domestic antitrust law in the international
arena. He finds the escape clause, too, works against competition18
but alleges the greatest difficulties are with section 337 of the 1930
Tariff Act, which is ironically "the one most resembling the antitrust
laws and yet the most criticized for the anticompetitive concerns
raised by its application." 19
Mendes' analysis of the antitrust problems arising from trade liti-
gation in the U.S. and the EC is also compelling. He finds more simi-
larities than differences between the two systems (pp. 193-97). Some
differences persist, however, which Mendes catalogues quite elegantly.
In the United States, companies tread a fine line between lobbying and
unlawfully exchanging business information (pp. 179-80). Voluntary
restraint and similar agreements also pose antitrust risks in the United
States after the Consumers Union case,20 while these risks are some-
what less in the EC.21
Mendes writes the first and second parts of his book casually and
compactly. They are complete enough, however, to prepare the reader
for the more interesting discussion in Part III, where all of the argu-
ments previously developed finally interrelate. Unfortunately, Part III
is as brief and casual as the first two parts. The plethora of exclama-
tion points - three on page 170 alone! - can be forgiven. The au-
thor, after all, is terribly upset about the Commission's failure to take
the Community interest into account when deciding on trade sanc-
tions. Despite being impressed by his fervor, however, after patiently
reviewing the history of antitrust and trade in expectation of this final
synthesis, the reader wishes to explore some of his arguments in more
detail. The two page conclusion is at once simplistic and cryptic.
18. P. 158. The escape clause is contained in §§ 201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2011-18 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54 (1988 & Supp. III
1991)). It allows the President to take action to protect an industry when increased imports are a
substantial cause or threat of serious injury.
19. P. 165. Section 337 deems unlawful any unfair methods of competition that destroy or
substantially injure an American industry, prevent the establishment of the industry, restrain or
monopolize trade in the United States, or threaten to do any of the above. 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (1988). See generally Daniel J. Plaine et al., Protection ofCompetitors or Protec-
tion of Competition: Section 337 and the Antitrust Laws, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 519 (1987).
20. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). See p. 185.
Voluntary restraint and similar agreements typically involve informal negotiations between gov-
ernments or between government and a foreign industry resulting in the foreign government or
industry's "voluntary" decision to limit imports. The court in Consumers Union upheld the
President's authority to negotiate with foreign companies but denied that he had authority to
give "binding assurances" of exemption from the antitrust laws. 352 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
21. [W]hile measures taken in pursuance of trade agreements between the Community and
third countries, as acts of external commercial policy, are not caught by Article 85(1) of the
EEC Treaty, agreements or concerted practices among foreign producers aimed at restrict-
ing exports to the EEC or at regulating their price or quality, unless imposed on such produ-
cers by the foreign authorities (foreign sovereign compulsion defense), would fall under the
reach of EEC antitrust rules.
P. 195 (citations omitted).
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In the final analysis, Mendes does an extraordinarily good job of
isolating the conflicts between antitrust and trade policy in the United
States and the European Community, but he leaves the reader some-
what baffled as to which legal system better resolves these conflicts.
He also does not explain how an international agreement might best be
structured for effectiveness and acceptance. Mendes ultimately raises
as many interesting questions as he answers.
_ Alyssa A. Grikscheit
